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The identity of the practitioner in the laboratory is 
contested, inventive, and inconsistent. The practitioner, 
consciously or unconsciously, is always already in a 
process of reassessing what she represents in her action. 
What I am specifically interested in here are the moments 
when the representational dissolves into something com-
ing from “inside,” something uncontrollably responsive, 
as in responding and feeling responsible for. It is neither 
arbitrary nor ordinary. I usually experience it as frantic 
and mostly reactive. It is reified within the act of doing 
something together in a particular group in a designated 
place. Even within the walls of the sterile enclosed studio 
space, identity is constantly recalled as a force to move 
through / around / by and from. It is contested because 
the practitioner constantly negotiates with grand cultural 
categories of being, becoming, and from-ness in her 
action. It is inventive because the practitioner creates and 
blends bodily techniques and methods to circumnavigate 
stereotypes and go beyond the representational. It is also 
inconsistent because it carries traces of intersecting and 
disparate geographies one identifies with: geographies 
of birth, growth, travel, trauma, and exile. Identity in the 
laboratory is never one fixed category but a relational 
unfolding practice.
— Nazlıhan Eda Erçin

In a non-imperial understanding of photography, the 
photograph is only one possible outcome of a complex 
encounter. The encounter involves not only the one who 
holds the camera and those in front of it, but also other 
participants, including imaginary spectators. These spec-
tators are not necessarily the same from the point of view 
of the photographed person as they are from that of the 
photographer. While the person who holds the camera is 
most likely committed to a milieu of experts — an editor, for 
example, in the different venues where the photograph is 
likely to be published, and an audience — the person who is 
photographed has perceptions and aspirations of her own. 
We should not let the photograph, a contingent product, 
overshadow the complex nature of the encounter out of 
which it was taken, nor to blur the inequalities, the patterns 
of exploitation, and the incommensurable expectations, 
aspirations, and modalities of participation inherent in a 
photographic event.
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Advanced Methods is a new imprint from punctum 
books, designed to offer practical and theoretical 
interventions through the rigorous elaboration of 
concrete new research methods and associated 
methodological frameworks. The working assumption 
is that methods are fundamental onto-epistemolog-
ical building blocks and therefore crucial leverage 
points from which institutional transformation might 
be initiated. In many cases, these transformations 
will necessarily take place in modes and media not 
amenable to the book form, such as the audiovisual 
works discussed in this first volume. Yet the book still 
has important work to do. The Advanced Methods 
imprint will primarily publish short books, like this 
one, that focus narrowly on a specific new research 
method, detailing both how to do it and what it does. 
These books are intended to be highly portable, 
compact, and inexpensive (print) or free (open ac-
cess), allowing them to move between different types 
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of spaces. They will bridge critical theory to new forms 
of experimentation and make a range of emerging 
methods available to practitioner-researchers within 
and beyond academia.
New methods take a long time to develop. I found-
ed Urban Research Theater as a research-oriented 
theater company in Poland in 2004. By 2007, I had 
moved back to New York City and was working regu-
larly with a single collaborator, Michele Farbman, on 
a rigorous exploration of nonlexical songs as a basis 
for embodied practice and research. During that time, 
I began to rethink the epistemic significance of the 
actor–director relationship and developed a simple 
technique of switching back and forth between these 
roles, which turned out to be the seed of the method 
described in this book. Between 2008 and 2013, I 
worked closely with another partner, Massimiliano 
Balduzzi, completed a PhD in Theater, and took up a 
teaching and research position in northern England. 
In early 2017, I wrote an introductory methodology for 
embodied research (Spatz 2017a), but this was still 
only a general overview of possibilities, not an actual 
method. Only in late 2017, during an “audiovisual 
embodied laboratory” project with Nazlıhan Eda 
Erçin and Agnieszka Mendel, did this long process 
crystallize in a form of work that deserves to be called 
a research method. I share this story to illustrate how 
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an entire decade was needed to get from the simple 
act of switching between roles to a fully developed 
embodied audiovisual research method. The purpose 
of this book is to describe that method, from a range 
of perspectives, in order to make it available for use by 
others.1
As this narrative suggests, what I offer here is not 
“just” or “merely” a research method. It could also be 
called an experimental practice, an artistic practice, 
or even a spiritual practice. Yet for me, the idea that 
this practice arrives to the status of research method 
1 Making a Laboratory is the culmination of fifteen years 
of Urban Research Theater, which would not have been 
possible without numerous collaborators. In Poland, the 
most important of these were Beata Zalewska and the dearly 
missed Iza Młynarz. In New York City, Michele Farbman and 
Massimiliano Balduzzi. In England, I developed the Judaica 
project first with Sióbhán Harrison and Jennifer Parkin and 
later with Nazlıhan Eda Erçin and Agnieszka Mendel, with 
further crucial input from Caroline Gatt. The latter phase 
was supported by the University of Huddersfield and the 
uk Arts and Humanities Research Council through the 
Leadership Fellow project “Judaica: An Embodied Laboratory 
for Songwork” (2016–2018). For more on Urban Research 
Theater, including some of the video works discussed here, 




constitutes a specific and radical claim. Making a 
Laboratory attempts to reconsider the relationship 
between embodiment and technology through a 
newly epistemic understanding of video. It is best 
understood as a textual addendum or prelude to a 
practical onto-epistemological proposal that cannot 
be realized within any text-based paradigm but 
instead requires the integration of textuality and au-
diovisuality within the medium of video. At the same 
time, this book is intended to stand on its own as a 
critical philosophical text, an intervention in some of 
the theoretical frameworks through which knowledge, 
embodiment, and performance are predominantly 
analyzed today. That is why, although the book is 
structured as a step-by-step introduction to a specific 
method, its practical instructions are accompanied 
throughout by a serious grappling with the practical 
and theoretical contributions of Jerzy Grotowski, 
Giorgio Agamben, Rebecca Schneider, Hito Steyerl, 
and others, as well as with the knowledge/practice 
communities of social epistemology and ethical 
kink. Further artistic and scholarly contexts for these 
discussions can be found in my other books (Spatz 
2015; 2020).
The first section of Making a Laboratory offers a 
working definition of laboratoriality that is independ-
21
preface
ent of technoscience. This may be useful for anyone 
who is looking to frame their practice rigorously as 
research. The next four sections describe the specific 
method of audiovisual embodied research that I 
developed, as described above, between 2007 and 
2017, which I call “Dynamic Configurations with 
Transversal Video” (dctv). Two sections are dedi-
cated to the “opening cut” of dynamic configurations 
(dc) and two to the “closing cut” of transversal video 
(tv). The final section locates dctv in a broader criti-
cal and political context and explores some of its im-
plications and potentials under the rubric of a “queer 
laboratory.” In general terms, what is introduced here 
is a new way of conceptualizing and implementing 
what Jerzy Grotowski called a “theater laboratory.” 
Indeed, dctv owes its techniques and ethics primarily 
to the worlds of contemporary theater and dance, es-
pecially their practices of collaborative creation (Colin 
and Sachsenmaier 2016). But the method described 
here also abandons the most fundamental principle of 
contemporary performing arts, namely the perfor-
mance of an artistic “work” before a live audience. 
It replaces this with something that is formally and 
technologically closer to cinema, although on closer 
inspection it is also unlike any existing approach to 
filmmaking. In fact, dctv is a blueprint for a new type 





Across contemporary arts and humanities, we find the 
body figured as technical. This idea can be founded in 
analyses of gender as technology (De Lauretis 1987); 
race as technology (Coleman 2009); somatechnics 
(Sullivan and Murray 2009); anthropotechnics 
(Sloterdijk 2013); the “original technicity of the body” 
(Gill-Peterson 2014); and my own work on embodied 
technique. What is this bodily technicity and how is it 
archived in fields of knowledge? More specifically, how 
does the contrast between writing and audiovisuality 
affect the ontology and epistemology of embodi-
ment? Theorists of embodiment often draw on their 
own lived experience, but they are not necessarily 
equipped to design rigorous experimental systems 
in practice. Instead, what we find in many branches 
of contemporary philosophy, from poststructuralism 
to new materialism and affect theory, is an anxious 
wrestling with the limits of language. This wrestling 
generates often very dense, sometimes poetic, 
making a laboratory
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sometimes powerful new terms and concepts. But for 
those outside these particular discourses, their appeal 
can be confusing. Why all this writing about the limits 
of writing? Why undertake a critique of philosophy in 
the medium of written text? Meanwhile, the fields of 
artistic research that are most actively developing new 
methods for experimental practice (e.g., Allegue et 
al. 2009; Nelson 2013; Barrett and Bolt 2013) often 
remain bound to notions of art and performance that 
undercut their epistemic ambitions. There is a pressing 
need for new experimental methods, for the “invention 
of new forms of philosophy” and new enactments of 
“what it means to think” (Maoilearca 2018: 108, 110).
The concept of the laboratory has a long history 
in theater and performance. Philosopher of science 
Robert Crease devoted a volume to developing an 
analogy between scientific experiments and theatri-
cal processes, according to which a laboratory “is a 
particular space of action” (1993: 106, italics original). 
But the analogy between laboratory and theater is 
as problematic for philosophers of science as it is for 
contemporary performers working in the lineage of 
Jerzy Grotowski’s “theater laboratory” (Grotowski 
1982; Schechner and Wolford 1997). While there 
are undoubtedly experimental aspects of theatrical 
processes, it has never been clear exactly how and 
when theatrical performances can be understood 
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to generate knowledge, or how such “performed” 
knowledge might be compared with that produced 
in the sciences or humanities. In theater-making, the 
aims of experimentation and knowledge production 
compete with those of artistic composition and public 
spectacle. How should we distinguish the space of the 
theatrical laboratory from that of theatrical produc-
tion? In my previous work, I have used social episte-
mology, a branch of science and technology studies, 
to demonstrate that embodied technique in fields like 
postural yoga, actor training, and gender is structured 
by knowledge as much as by habit and repetition 
(Spatz 2015). Here I extend this thesis by synthesiz-
ing key insights from two major theorists of scientific 
experimentation, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Karen 
Barad.1 The understanding that follows does not result 
from squeezing embodied practice and performing 
1 Rheinberger calls himself a historian of science and is an 
important figure in early social epistemology, inspiring 
the work of Karin Knorr Cetina and many others. Barad’s 
writing on laboratory science is more recent and employs a 
different rhetorical strategy, part of what has been called the 
ontological turn. Rather than linking culture and materiality 
at the level of discipline, Barad locates this entanglement in 
experimentation itself, using the term “onto-epistemology” to 
grasp the workings of laboratories. Barad’s onto-epistemology 
making a laboratory
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arts into a scientific or quantitative frame, but instead 
from recognizing that the social and historical models 
offered by Rheinberger’s “philosophy of experimental 
practice” (Lenoir in Rheinberger 2010: xi) far exceed 
the technoscientific domains that inspired them. 
My emphasis here is neither on the wider context of 
science studies nor on their implications for critical 
ontologies — although I touch upon these matters 
below — but on the practical, methodological, and 
onto-epistemic structure of the laboratory as a place 
of sustained and systematic investigation. What 
parameters define the time and space of “labora-
toriality” (Schino 2009: 24)? How is this “space of 
action” set apart from others and by what mechanism 
does it make its specific contributions to knowledge?
For Rheinberger, experimental practices involve “a 
permanent process of reorientation and reshuffling of 
the boundary between what is thought to be known,” 
the technical, “and what is beyond imagination,” the 
epistemic (Rheinberger 1997: 11). This suggests a kind 
of border or edge, continually redrawn, between the 
known and the unknown, which any given experi-
mental system implements in a specific way. A similar 




model is proposed by Barad in her examination of the 
experimental systems of quantum physics:
The boundary between the “object of observation” and 
the “agencies of observation” is indeterminate in the 
absence of a specific physical arrangement of the ap-
paratus. What constitutes the object of observation and 
what constitutes the agencies of observation are deter-
minable only on the condition that the measurement 
apparatus is specified. The apparatus enacts a cut 
delineating the object from the agencies of observation. 
Clearly, then, as we have noted, observations do not 
refer to properties of observation-independent objects. 
(Barad 2007: 114, italics removed)
For Barad, the “cut delineating the object from the 
agencies of observation” is essentially defined by an 
act of measurement. Yet the image of the cut, with 
its decisive cleaving of a whole into parts, can be 
applied much more broadly if we clarify two points. 
First, it is hardly the apparatus by itself that enacts an 
onto-epistemological cut. What makes something a 
measuring device in the first place is a whole ensemble 
of social and technical conditions that constitute 
an experimental system. Second, my key point here: 
There is not one cut needed to produce laboratorial 
making a laboratory
28
space, but rather two distinct cuts, with a crucial gap 
between them.
If there were just one cut separating the “object 
of observation” (Barad) or “epistemic thing” (Rhein-
berger) from the technical conditions that produce it, 
then it would not be possible to retrieve any meaning-
ful data from the experimental event, because the 
definition of the experiment would be the same as its 
result. In each of the experimental systems described 
by Rheinberger and Barad, there are actually two 
cuts, two distinct ways or moments in which the tech-
nical interacts with and defines the epistemic. These 
two cuts are not separated by time or space, but by 
knowledge. That is, the opening cut does not happen 
first or in a different place from the closing cut; rather, 
the two cuts happen simultaneously and together, 
the difference between them being their relation to 
the space of unknown that emerges between them 
because it is defined precisely by them. Thus, what 
Barad calls a “cut” is more accurately a gap created 
by two cuts, one on either “side” of it. This gap has 
epistemic width or thickness and it is “inside” the gap, 
in the unpredictable phenomena that emerge be-
tween the experimental conditions and the measure-
ment of what happens, that the experiment unfolds. 
As Barad demonstrates at length, the unknown be-
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comes knowable in experimental science through an 
act of measurement. But the measurement cannot be 
the same as the experimental conditions, or else noth-
ing could be learned. Thus, the cut is always two cuts, 
or better, two sets of cuts. These occur simultaneously 
but have different epistemic positions, one instigating 
the experimental event and the other measuring it. 
Barad declares, “what is at issue is the cut that makes 
a distinction between object and instrument” (2007: 
328). If we clarify that, in practice, this cut is always 
made twice, in two different epistemic locations, and 
that the object therefore appears between two differ-
ent sets of instruments, then we will be in a position to 
apply the idea of epistemic cuts in situations that have 
little to do with technoscientific measurement.
A single cut would be like a scientist who slips a 
slide into the microscope and then refrains from peer-
ing through the lens, or who takes a detailed reading 
of an empty chamber into which nothing of interest 
has been inserted. Such actions would be epistemi-
cally incomplete. In the first example, an experimental 
event is “opened” but not closed; in the second, it is 
“closed” without having been opened. To generate 
new knowledge, both cuts are needed: the opening 
cut, also known as the initial or technical conditions of 
the experiment, which generates a situation or object 
of interest; and the closing cut, by which that mani-
making a laboratory
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festation is measured, imaged, or otherwise traced. 
The opening cut generates a potentially interesting 
space of unknown — Crease’s “space of action” in its 
narrowest sense — while the closing cut produces a 
trace of what happens there. Hence the experimental 
cut is always two cuts: a cut that specifies conditions 
for something to happen and a cut that derives traces 
from what happens. Referring to these two cuts as 
a single cut effectively builds a particular interpreta-
tion of the experiment into its description, as if the 
relationship between opening and closing cuts were 
fully transparent or determinative. This is only possible 
retroactively: After the experiment has been enacted 
and interpreted, one can perhaps retrospectively 
describe both the experiment’s initial conditions and 
its outcome as a single cultural-material or onto-
epistemic structure. In contrast, from a practical 
perspective, when one is immersed in the details of 
planning or designing an experiment, it is precisely 
the complex and rigorously indeterminate relationship 
between the opening and closing cuts that generates 
interest in what might take place between them.
The project that inspired this writing was well-
supported for humanities research, with ample 
technology and a paid team of three researchers. But 
an experiment in the sense defined here is constituted 
on a micro level every time that a precise relationship 
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is set up between initial conditions and the derivation 
of a trace via an experimental moment, regardless of 
whether a designated room or any specialized tech-
nologies are used. To further generalize the concept of 
laboratoriality, we need to go beyond the assumption 
that the closing cut of experimentation is always 
defined by measurement. Barad writes: “What we 
usually call a ‘measurement’ is a correlation or entan-
glement between component parts of a phenomenon, 
between the ‘measured object’ and the ‘measuring 
device’, where the measuring device is explicitly taken 
to be macroscopic so that we can read the pattern of 
marks that the measured object leaves on it” (2007: 
337). I have already noted that that the “measured 
object” cannot appear for the “measuring device” 
unless an epistemically distinct opening cut has been 
made. Additionally, in our context, measurement will 
not usually be the most appropriate term by which 
to name the closing cut. Measurement, or quantified 
tracing, is a special case of the “pattern of marks” that 
may be generated through experimentation, which 
Rheinberger calls “graphematic concatenations” or 
“engravings” (Rheinberger 1997: 3). Although its vast 
power and impact through technology is undeniable, 
quantified measurement is by no means the only kind 
of tracing or inscription that can act as a closing cut 
for experimentation. Indeed, to take measurement as 
making a laboratory
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the paradigm of the cut, as Barad does, is implicitly 
to center mathematical physics as the paradigmatic 
mode of knowledge.2 We could go further and say 
that inscription itself is unnecessary for experimenta-
tion. Certainly, a kind of experimentation can take 
place without any type of inscription. The most basic 
experiment would take the form: Let’s do X and see 
what happens, where “X” is the opening cut and “see 
what happens” is the closing cut. I will therefore call 
“laboratorial” a particular kind of rigor associated 
with the implementation of inscription at both cuts. 
According to that definition, “Let’s do X and see what 
happens” would be experimental but not laboratorial, 
2 This may be the most significant difference between the 
accounts of Rheinberger and Barad. While Rheinberger 
emphasizes “the fragmentation of the sciences into disunified 
areas” (1997: 179) and even acknowledges a debt to art 
history in formulating his theory (4), Barad’s argument is 
based on a reading of quantum physics as a “completely 
general” theory that “supersedes” everything prior (2007: 
110). While she intends to use quantum indeterminacy as 
a starting point for an ethical and political destabilization 
of ontology, her centering of physics as the paradigmatic 
form of research seriously undercuts this aim. Despite their 
commonalities, Meeting the Universe Halfway barely mentions 




because its opening and closing cuts are not ar-
chivally traced. An experiment becomes a laboratory 
when both cuts are traced or inscribed archivally, so 
that those not present can have mediated access to 
both “what was done” (the opening cut) and “what 
happened” (the closing cut).
By defining laboratoriality in this way, I foreground 
experimentation that uses archival inscription  — but 
not measurement  — to establish the rigor of its 
cuts. I do this because I consider the investigation of 
non-quantitative archival inscription to be one of the 
core duties of academia in a technoscientific age. 
Accordingly, I offer three definitions: Experimentality 
is any kind of “trying out” (opening cut) coupled with 
observation (closing cut). Laboratoriality, or inscriptive 
experimentality, requires that both the “trying out” 
and the observation be archivally traced. (This makes 
the question of what constitutes an adequate tracing 
an essential part of experimental design). Finally, 
technoscientific laboratoriality pertains where the clos-
ing cut is not only archival but also quantitative, as in 
measurement. These definitions put technoscience in 
its epistemological place, as a uniquely powerful but 
onto-epistemologically narrow type of research. All 
three types of research are structured by an epistemic 
gap between opening and closing cuts. This gap 
is not simply an “edge” (Rheinberger) or singular 
making a laboratory
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“cut” (Barad) between the known and the unknown, 
but a tiny open zone between two cuts that defines 
experimental, laboratorial, and technoscientific 
events. To adapt Barad: It’s all a matter of where we 
place the cuts (2007: 348). Within any given moment 
of laboratoriality, a multiplicity of highly complex 
emergent phenomena are simultaneously opened, 
or instigated, and closed, or traced, in particular 
ways. When we decide where to place  — that is, how 
to implement — the opening and closing cuts of an 
experimental system, we are limiting in advance what 
can happen inside it and what can be traced of that 
happening. These decisions are always intuitive to a 
degree, even in technoscience, where “the interaction 
between scientific object and technical conditions is 
eminently nontechnical in its character” and scientists 
“are, first and foremost, bricoleurs (tinkerers), not 
engineers” (Rheinberger 1997: 32). Yet these deci-
sions also build upon vast bodies of knowledge that 
sediment as the domain of the technical in any given 
field.
A definition of laboratoriality based on two 
archivally inscribed cuts can be used to reexamine 
existing methodologies in artistic research and other 
emerging interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary fields. 
One can apply to any research method such basic 
questions as: What is the opening cut and how is it 
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archivally traced? What is the closing cut and how is 
it archivally traced? This framework replaces the tech-
noscientific emphasis on measurement with a broader 
understanding of onto-epistemological cuts in relation 
to archives and their varied affordances. Noting that 
“the word science derives from the Latin scientia, ‘to 
separate one thing from another,’ which is related to 
the Indo-European root skei, ‘to cut, split’” (Schneider 
1997: 203n4), we could even attempt to reclaim the 
word “science” for non-quantitative cuts, such as 
those described in the rest of this book. If knowledge 
in a general sense is coextensive with life and has no 
need for archival inscription, we nevertheless must 
recognize the role played by archives and inscription 
in any institutionalization of knowledge that goes 
beyond direct interpersonal transmission. This is the 
point at which I would hope to intervene in the politics 
of knowledge, research, and academia. If scholarly 
institutions of knowledge are founded on particular 
relations with archives, rather than specifically on 
the medium of writing — by which I mean all forms of 
numerical, textual, and musical notation — then the 
advent of audiovisual research stands to radically 
transform the university and perhaps knowledge itself. 
At issue here is not only the forms that research can be 
understood to take, but also who can be recognized 
making a laboratory
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as conducting research and what can be counted as 
knowledge.
Leaving these broader questions aside, I now turn 
to a specific new research method that is, in these 
terms, strictly laboratorial but not technoscientific. 
The method is named “Dynamic Configurations with 





Imagine that three people take turns occupying the 
roles of practitioner, director, and videographer. As 
a starting point, the trio works according to a daily 
schedule in which each team member occupies each 
role for 90 minutes, with a 30-minute break between 
rotations. A complete rotation through three of six 
possible configurations, therefore, takes six hours. On 
some days, a shorter rotation schedule is used, such 
as 30 minutes per role with no breaks in between (90 
minutes in total), to allow more time for discussion 
and for reviewing the video recordings generated by 
the process. In the project that led to the formalization 
of the method described here, I initially proposed such 
a structure of rotating roles as a way for three full-time 
“embodied researchers” to get to know each other 
and to start experimenting with the use of a video 
camera in studio practice. However, this approach 
soon led to a number of challenging questions: What 
exactly are the responsibilities and powers, the limits 
making a laboratory
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and obligations, of each of the three named roles? 
How does the role of “director” here differ from that 
of a professional theatrical or cinematic director? 
What guidelines or rules should the videographer 
follow? How does the presence of the camera affect 
the practice? Does the trio need to agree upon a 
shared topic or focus before beginning each session? 
To what extent do the three roles imply hierarchical 
relations and to what extent can they function in a 
collaborative, horizontal, or micro-democratic way? 
How are these flexible or dynamic relationships 
affected by the more static and institutionally rigid 
power relations that structure the project and the 
institutions within which the research takes place? 
This section begins to answer these questions through 
a discussion of the notation system I developed, with 
Nazlıhan Eda Erçin and Agnieszka Mendel, to specify 
“dynamic configurations” in experimental practice. 
Another crucial question — what can be done with the 
videographic materials produced by this process — will 
be addressed in the second half of the book.
The three roles just mentioned were initially defined 
in the simplest of terms.1 In our team, each of the three 
1 I am aware of several other triad structures for experimental 
or interactive practice, including Sandra Reeve’s extension 
of Authentic Movement to include a “meta-witness”; a 
dynamic configurations: notation
39
researchers had a background in some kind of post-
Grotowskian ensemble theater (this term is defined 
below), which gave us a degree of shared under-
standing as to the kinds of relationship that can exist 
between a performer or practitioner and someone 
who “directs” them. We also shared an overarching, 
formal investigative framework, aiming to explore 
the relationship between technique and identity by 
working practically with a particular set of songs (see 
Spatz 2019). However, it immediately became clear 
that the interactions between us were revealing dif-
ferences as much as similarities, even with regard the 
most basic questions: What is a song? How does one 
begin to work with a song? What counts as practice? 
What is the task of directing? Each of us approached 
mentoring practice at the Institute for Advanced Performance 
and Scenography Studies in Brussels (https://apass.
be/); “Rewriting Distance,” developed by Lin Snelling and 
Guy Cools (http://rewritingdistance.com/); and Katrina 
McPherson’s “Human Camera” structure. Artistic researcher 
Sami Haapala is developing an audiovisual research method 
in which a performer and a participant, each wearing an 
action camera, are simultaneously recorded by an external 
videographer. It would be useful to compare the diverse ways 




the act of singing in a different way, bringing with us 
many layers of personal and professional embodied 
knowledge. As these questions arose, we began to 
examine more explicitly the power dynamics at work, 
both inside and outside the studio. Within the studio, 
the continual rotation of roles worked to destabilize 
power relations, rendering them fragmented and 
circulatory. Rotation not only ensured that the power 
accruing to each role would move between the team 
members, but also tended to generate a sense of 
overall equality between the roles themselves. At the 
same time, the project was formally defined by an 
explicit “static configuration” according to which, as 
Principal Investigator, I was responsible as supervisor 
for the two Research Assistants (Erçin and Mendel). 
These dynamics were further ramified by differences 
of gender, race, nationality, immigration status, 
religious affiliation, linguistic competency, academic 
accreditation, professional experience, and more.
After a few weeks, two limitations of the basic 
rotating trio structure became clear. First, the 
practitioner was always alone in the space of prac-
tice — undertaking solo practice — since the director 
and videographer were present in their own separate 
capacities, intervening only from outside. Second, the 
assumption that we would spend an equal amount of 
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time in each configuration prevented us from explor-
ing the potential of any single configuration in greater 
depth. To enable a wider range and depth of pos-
sibilities, I invited each member of the team to offer a 
specific proposal for how the laboratory work should 
proceed. In which configurations, and according to 
what schedule? As an aid to sharing these proposals, 
and to support the ensuing conversations, I invented 
an apparently simple notation system that condensed 
each configuration to just a few marks on paper. I had 
previously toyed with the idea of developing a nota-
tion system for studio-based experimental practice, 
but this was the first time that the desire for notation 
had arisen directly out of the needs of practice. Signifi-
cantly, I did not propose the use of notation in order to 
formalize the epistemic objects with which we thought 
we were working. My understanding at the time was 
that our primary epistemic objects were the songs, not 
the relationships between the researchers or between 
the roles. Only gradually, as our use of the notation 
became less descriptive and more prescriptive, did I 
come to understand the power of this notation system 
to formalize aspects of embodied practice that usually 
remain implicit. At this point, the relations formalized 
in the notation became objects of epistemic interest in 
a wholly new way.
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The notation for dynamic configurations ap-
propriates algebraic symbols and uses them to 
indicate formal relations between individuals, who are 
represented by letters. Using this notation, our initial 
“trio rotations” can be easily written out as formulae. 
For example, in the first session of the first day of 
work, I, Ben, was in the role of practitioner; Agnieszka 
was in the role of director; and Eda was in the role of 
videographer. Using our first initials, this configura-
tion can be written as follows:
[B]<A/E
The same formula can be written in abstract form, 
without referring to specific individuals, by simply 
using letters in alphabetical order:
[A]<B/C
For a while, I understood this notation system as 
describing three roles. However, as I have thought 
more deeply about the function of these appropri-
ated algebraic symbols in structuring practice, I 




SYMBOL    RELATION     
_ (underscore)    the relation to memorized
       or incorporated materials
[ ] (square brackets)   the relation of practitioners  
        within a shared space of  
        practice
< > ^ (triangle or arrow)  the primary external or
        “directorial” relation
/ — (slash or bar)   the videographic relation
Each symbol can be understood as an opening cut 
that structures experimental practice. Indeed, they 
each enact a type of division or scission that polarizes 
and defines what happens in the practice. The first 
three relations are fundamental to a wide variety 
of embodied and performing arts. If we want to 
emphasize the aspect of caring that attends each 
relation, we might call these four relations of care. 
Each relation can be grasped in a very simple way, at 
least initially, but each is also philosophically rich and 
deserving of serious examination in its own right.
The underscore _ functions to cut a particular set 
of trained or memorized materials out of a practition-
er’s habitus, or sedimented embodiment, highlighting 
it as an explicit focus of the practice. These materials, 
such as a song, text, or exercise, are memorized or 
incorporated by the practitioner and the practi-
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tioner is said to have responsibility, custodianship, or 
stewardship for them.2 The brackets [] separate the 
space of practice from another space immediately 
external to it, from which what happens there may be 
witnessed, directed, or videographed. Although the 
space of practice is often literally spatial, it is more 
precisely defined by the intercorporeal relations of the 
practitioners within it and by their separation from 
the rest of the world; in theater, this is what we call 
the “fourth wall.” The triangle or arrow < refers to the 
relationship between the practitioner and someone 
whom I tentatively call the “director,” a term that will 
be further examined below. Finally, the slash / imple-
ments a technological cut defined by the presence 
of an audiovisual recording device, such as a video 
camera. When combined as a formula and taken 
as the premise of an experimental practice session, 
these four cuts operate as a single cut that “opens” 
2 My use of “stewardship” here comes from indigenous 
arguments around intellectual property. In contrast to 
a “commons” approach to knowledge, which combats 
commercialism by arguing for an open flow of materials, a 
stewardship approach recognizes a kind of propriety that is 
not property and which is based on care and responsibility 
rather than use and exploitation. Intellectual property issues 
are further discussed below.
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laboratorial space and gives it a particular epistemic 
shape. The power of this notation system to specify 
such dynamic configurations is best demonstrated 
through a series of illustrations.
Figure 1 shows how three standard theatrical 
configurations can be notated.3 In a rehearsal for a 
standard “scene study,” two actors work together in a 
shared space of practice. Each of them is responsible 
for a chunk of memorized material in the form of 
“lines” learned from a script, while a third person C 
offers direction from outside the space of practice. 
When it comes time to perform the scene, the same 
structure [AB] obtains within the space of practice, 
but the director figure is replaced by an indeterminate 
number of audience members CDE… These people 
occupy the same position as the director, just outside 
the space of practice, but are not empowered to give 
direction to the actors. The third formula shows a 
different situation: a workshop or class in which one 
person, the teacher or leader, gives direction to a 
number of others. In the workshop configuration, the 
director is inside the space of practice and is respon-
sible for introducing a specified chunk of memorized 
3 Figures 1–3 use LaTeX typesetting. Thanks to Ben Blum-Smith 





[AB] < C (rehearsal)
[AB]CDE... (performance)
[A > BCD...] (workshop)
1




material, which is the pedagogical content of the 
workshop.
Notating the implicit structure of three common 
forms of practice allows us to recognize the rigid 
and formulaic way in which we so often approach 
these vital relations. Indeed, one can study or teach 
acting, dance, singing, or other performing arts for 
years without ever substantially deviating from these 
three basic configurations. Most often, the roles and 
relations I have just defined never circulate within 
a given project. The person who is directing on the 
first day continues to do so until the moment of 
performance and all other roles remain static as well. 
I call this a static configuration. Frequently the role of 
director is also mapped onto other, even more rigidly 
established hierarchies. For example, in pedagogical 
contexts, the teacher almost always takes the role of 
director, with the students as performers. Rarely does 
a teacher — even a teacher of directing — put them-
selves in the role of performer to be directed by their 
students. Using notation to open a wider space of 
dynamic configurations reveals just how static many 
of our common working configurations are. Of course, 
one could argue that these basic configurations are 
ubiquitous because they are effective and that static 
configurations provide a degree of stability that is 
















Figure 2. Dynamic Configurations: Lab design for the Judaica 
project, June 1, 2017. 
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that. However, once the implicit configurations 
underlying our practices are made explicit, we cannot 
ignore the invitation to question them and to consider 
what might happen if we worked more dynamically.
Figure 2 shows some of the concrete possibilities 
that are immediately opened by dc notation. The 
three formulae make use of the same relations that 
structure standard rehearsal, performance, and work-
shop situations, but here the relations are approached 
more freely, using their formalization in notation to 
specify other kinds of practice structures. In addition, 
a fourth relation, the videographic, is added. The first 
configuration [B]<A/E is the one already introduced 
above: a “triangle” in which each of the researchers 
occupies one of the basic roles. Here, the practitioner 
is alone in the space, working in relation to some 
specified materials. (It is important to note the differ-
ence between this configuration and a standard film-
making configuration, where the director is empow-
ered to direct both practitioner and videographer.) 
In the second configuration [E>A]/B, Eda directs 
Agnieszka from inside the space of practice. Moreo-
ver, it is Eda who is responsible here for introducing 
specific embodied materials into the practice. Eda in 
this configuration is a kind of practitioner-director, 
while Agnieszka is a practitioner-improviser, who is 
















Figure 3. Dynamic Configurations: Lab design for the Judaica 
project, June 26–29, 2017.
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nor for offering direction but simply for sharing the 
space of practice with Eda. (See below for a further 
discussion of improvisation.) In the third configuration 
[AE]/<B, Eda and Agnieszka are together in the 
space as practitioners, with only Agnieszka respon-
sible for particular materials, while Ben is outside the 
space as both director and videographer.
Writing these configurations out as formulae 
allows us to analyze them in relation to each other 
and as part of an overall design. For example, we 
can see that, in this three-part lab design, each 
configuration is centered around the materials (in 
this case, songs) for which one of the practitioners is 
responsible. However, the way in which these materi-
als are introduced and explored differs significantly. 
Ben’s songs are introduced in solo practice; Eda’s 
songs in duo practice which Eda herself directs; and 
Agnieszka’s songs in duo practice with an external 
director. On the right side of the page, we see a 
proposal for differential allotment of time: 50% for 
the top configuration and 25% for each of the other 
two. This may refer to the proportion of time spent in 
each configuration on a given day, week, month, or 
any other period. Both the configurations and their 
proportional time allotment can be changed as often 
as needed, creating an iterative cycle of research that 
moves between two temporalities — that of the lab 
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and that of video editing and lab design — as I discuss 
at length later on. Finally, in Figure 3, a fourth team 
member is added. In this case, visiting anthropologist 
and performer Caroline Gatt joins the team in three 
different four-person configurations.
Dynamic configurations are most easily imple-
mented, at least initially, through a metaphorical 
spatialization involving concentric circles. In this 
mapping, we conceive of an inner space occupied 
by the practitioner(s), which is surrounded by the 
intermedial zone of the director, and then further out 
the external space of the videographer, all of which 
together constitute the laboratory as a contained 
space. Alternatively, we could reverse the direction 
of spatialization and describe the practitioner as 
moving outwards on a kind of journey, which is linked 
via the director back to a here-and-now in which the 
videographer remains. Either way, implementing such 
techniques of spatialization can be useful as a way to 
begin working with dynamic configurations. However, 
it is important to remember that these spatial relations 
are ultimately only metaphorical. In fact, an important 
function of the dc notation is to free these relations 
from the spatial structures and other trappings that 
attend institutionalized performing arts. Accordingly, 
the space of practice [] need not be physically inside, 
outside, or even separate from that of the whole 
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laboratory. Moreover, the laboratory itself need not be 
an enclosed room, because it is the dynamic configu-
rations themselves that produce the opening cut of 
dctv’s specific laboratoriality. Once this is grasped, 
the researchers can move freely in shared physical 
space without breaking the dc relations. Eventually, 
the space of the studio can also be abandoned for 
more richly emplaced “site specific” locations, all 
while retaining the rigor of dynamic configurations as 
dctv’s opening cut.
It is important to emphasize that the dc nota-
tion system as described here is not fixed or final, 
but merely a trace of a process that can be used to 
structure or inspire other processes. Like many (if 
not all) notation systems, it revealed its significance 
through prescriptive rather than simply descriptive 
application, allowing us to imagine and specify 
practice structures that we would not otherwise have 
considered. The nine configurations notated here only 
scratch the surface of what is possible with dynamic 
configurations. Many other possible configurations 
for three or four researchers are not pictured here, let 
alone configurations involving more participants. A 
larger audiovisual embodied laboratory structured 
by dc notation would have tremendously rich options 
for structuring practice sessions. Even prior to specific 
configurations, a five-person research team contains 
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sixteen possible groups of three or more (one quintet, 
five quartets, and ten trios), while a six-person team 
affords forty-two such groups (one sextet, six quintets, 
fifteen quartets, and twenty trios). Each subgroup 
can be arranged in countless configurations using the 
four essential dc relations. From this perspective, a 
group of five or six researchers working with dynamic 
configurations offers an incredibly wide landscape 
for experimental practice — virtually all of which is left 
untouched by a standard production process that 
locks a single static configuration in place across 
weeks, months, or years of practice.
As proposed here, the dc notation contains some 
ambiguities. Even in the most basic formula [A]<B/C, 
it may not be clear to what extent the videographer 
should record the director. The director is not inside 
the space of practice, but the camera itself defines 
another space, which may or may not be understood 
as identical to that defined by the practitioner. Other 
intriguing questions arise from the notation itself. For 
example, is it possible for someone outside the space 
of practice to be responsible for embodied materials? 
Could an external director have materials [A]<B and 
in what sense would they be responsible for them 
if not through practice? (Perhaps this configura-
tion describes the work of a master teacher of a 
highly codified form: Such a teacher makes detailed 
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corrections on their student, not as a creative helper 
or composing artist but as one who bears greater 
responsibility for that which is being practiced.) The 
same question can be asked about the videographer: 
Can a person bearing the videographic relation have 
materials [A]/B and to what would this refer? The 
videographer could sing while recording, but equally 
the movement of the camera could be linked to a 
choreography. Thinking in such a formalized way 
about embodied and experimental practice may be 
experienced as limiting, restrictive, or exasperating. 
On the other hand, it may be radically exhilarating. 
This is not algebra and there is no suggestion here 
that the future of this notation can be worked out on 
the page. Rather, the point is that the formalization 
of these relations, which are so often left implicit and 
static, raises questions that might be worth exploring.
To avoid some of the notation’s ambiguities, we 
could implement a default “order of operations.” 
In that case, for example, we could decide to as-
sume — unless specified otherwise, using parentheses 
as in algebra — that the four relations take precedence 
according to the order in which I have introduced 
them. This clarifies the formula [A]<B/C, which now 
refers unambiguously to a situation in which the 
videographer records both the practitioner and the 
director. We could then use parentheses to specify a 
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configuration [A](<B/C) in which the videographer 
records only the director. But how would we specify a 
configuration in which both director and videographer 
relate only to the practitioner (which is actually how 
I most often introduce this work)? We might have to 
resort to a complex formula like [A]<B + [A]/C, which 
specifies two separate and simultaneous configura-
tions. Nor have I yet even mentioned configurations 
that involve multiple directors or videographers, 
although these and many other possibilities are 
implied by the notation. Building on the previous 
example, we could perhaps write [AC] + [A]<B + 
[C]<D to specify two practitioners working together 
in a shared space of practice, with each receiving 
separate direction from one of two directors. If there 
are multiple videographers, we could use the position 
of the / to specify how they relate to each other. Thus, 
[ABC<D]/E/F/G might suggest that three videog-
raphers occupy three nested layers around a directed 
trio, so that G is intentionally recording a recording 
of a recording. On the other hand, [ABC<D]///EFG 
might suggest three videographers working in the 
same layer of recording, simultaneously documenting 
the director and practitioners in three different ways.
We could also try to build up dctv from the begin-
ning, step by step:
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A     a person with no set material and no 
    separation from “everyday life”
[A]    solo practitioner with no set material
[A]    solo practitioner with set material
[AB]    duo practitioners with no set material
[AB]    duo practitioners with one having set 
    material
[AB]    duo practitioners with both having set 
    material
[A]<B   directed practitioner with no set material
[A]<B   directed practitioner with set material
[A<B]   duo practitioners with internal direction 
    from the one without set material
[A>B]   duo practitioners with internal direction 
    from the one with set material
[A]/B   back to the solo practitioner with no set 
    material, but now with video recording
and so on… 
These affordances of the notation may be worth 
exploring. However, I will not attend any further here 
to the specification of the notation or the question of 
how to make it more comprehensive, more complex, 
or more unambiguous. The distinctive characteristic 
of dc notation is in the choice of what gets notated, 
that is, in terms of laboratorial epistemology, where 
the cuts are made. dc notation cuts into embodied 
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practice at a point that is very often ignored: the 
modes of relation, interactivity, and power that obtain 
amongst people who are working together around 
and within a shared space of practice. In doing so, 
it opens up concrete new possibilities for structuring 
such relations.
The same room, the same song, the same body, 
can suddenly take on different meanings because 
the implementation of the cut has been changed. 
Processes that we usually call “training,” “rehearsal,” 
or “improvisation” now offer different tracings of 
bodies and powers than they did before. dc notation 
can even be interpreted as an alternative mapping or 
alternative theory of embodiment, insofar as it slices 
embodiment differently, considering a set of roles and 
relations as the relevant constituent elements of em-
bodiment, rather than a set of body parts, anatomical 
systems, tasks, gestures, or choreographies. Rather 
than dwell further on the notation itself, the next sec-
tion examines each of the four basic relations, taking 
a deeper dive into their practical and philosophical 
implications. This discussion is not required in order to 
begin practical experimentation with the dc notation 
and can be skipped by readers wishing to explore 
these tools on their own. In fact, the notation itself is 
unnecessary when getting started. To jump right in, 
just start working with the roles of practitioner, direc-
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tor, and videographer. It is only when the limitations of 
a “three roles” approach are encountered in practice 
that a more complex way of specifying configurations, 
through four relations, might be needed. At the same 
time, a deeper wrestling with the meaning of these 
core relations — freeing them as much as possible 
from the ways they are conventionally instrumental-
ized in performing arts — may help us to understand 






This section examines, in greater depth, the four key 
relations specified by dynamic configurations. As 
noted above, each of these relations is philosophically 
rich in its own right. When we begin to look more 
closely at them and to ask what they really entail, 
it becomes clear that each is a microcosm with 
fascinating links to contemporary debates around 
embodiment, representation, identity, power, and 
knowledge. It may be perceived as reductive or even 
positivist to notate these relations using symbols 
appropriated from algebra. On the contrary, the 
formal narrowness of these symbols can help us to 
open up a richer discussion about what each of the 
relations they denote involves. Keeping in mind that 
the symbols here are not actually algebraic — they 
specify relations between people rather than between 
numbers — allows us to undertake a philosophical 
investigation of their content. Thus, we begin from 
the question of what it means to be responsible for 
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specified material, rather than the presumed role of 
actor, dancer, musician, or performer; from the ques-
tion of what it means to be inside a space of practice, 
alone or with others, rather than assumptions about 
rehearsal, performance, and the stage; from the 
question of what is the primary external relation to 
that space, rather than conventional ideas about the 
director, choreographer, or conductor; and from the 
question of audiovisual recording itself, rather than 
assumptions about performance documentation or 
filmmaking. By seriously investigating these relations, 
we can arrive at a new understanding of embodied 
arts as fields of experimental research.
The choice of materials with which to 
work — whether a dramatic script, musical score, set of 
songs, movement combination, interview transcripts, 
prior films, newspaper articles, personal memories, or 
any other embodiable material — is often understood 
as the single most important decision in a performing 
arts process. For that reason, the actual selection of 
material is not discussed at length here. Whether or 
not performance is understood as an instantiation 
of a pre-existing musical or dramatic “work” (Goehr 
1992), the choice to nominate a particular set of 
embodied materials for practice or performance is 
central to nearly all embodied arts. Even in situations 
of apprenticeship, where the primary commitment 
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may be to a specific teacher rather than what they 
teach, there will unavoidably be some reference to 
exercises, forms, technique, repeatable sequences, 
compositions, combinations, scores, repertoire, 
scripts, roles (in the sense of scripted characters or 
improvised archetypes with particular “bits”), songs, 
or other embodied materials. Likewise, every practice 
called improvisation defines itself in relation to certain 
other practices and their reliance upon explicitly speci-
fied materials. The choice of repeatable embodied 
material applies as much to popular musical concerts 
and sports as to theater, dance, and performing arts. 
Indeed, most performance notation systems, from 
written dramatic scripts and musical scores to various 
forms of dance and movement notation, notate this 
kind of material. It can further be argued that what 
we understand as performance material is often 
defined retrospectively by our capacity to notate. 
Such notation systems specify, in more or less detail, 
what someone in the role of performer or practitioner 
should do. Periodically, new notation systems are 
invented to augment existing ones. (For example, 
conversation analysis notation further specifies the 
rhythms of speech; new forms of musical notation 
specify aspects of music that are not captured by 
standard European musical notation.) Notation 
systems usually originate from the descriptive impulse 
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to record and thus archivally remember what people 
are doing; they then go on to open up new possibili-
ties as prescriptive scores.
In dc notation, all of the materials just mentioned 
are indicated by a simple underscore A (illustrated 
in Figure 4). In my own embodied research, this 
underscore most often refers to a song or set of 
songs, but it can just as easily refer to a memorized 
text, a choreographic sequence, a musical work, or a 
scripted or improvised role or character. The conden-
sation of such widely varying material into a single 
symbol marks a significant shift in the placement of 
the opening or “technical” cut, which distinguishes 
dctv from most performing arts practice. Within dc 
notation, we do not find anything representing par-
ticular songs, exercises, actions, rhythms, melodies, 
gestures, characters, or words. All of that is notated 
instead as a relationship between a practitioner 
and the materials for which they are responsible, 
a relationship in which exploration and investiga-
tion depend upon responsibility and stewardship. 
At the same time, this relation is a kind of “care of 
the self” (Foucault 1986a), understood not as a 
turning inwards but as a complex engagement with 
embodied materials that contributes to an individual’s 
growth, development, personal discovery, cultivation, 
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self-discipline, and holistic health. Why do I call these 
chunks of technique “materials” when, from a physics 
or biology perspective, they are exactly the opposite of 
matter? By formalizing this relation, I call attention to 
the distinctive ontologies of embodied and performing 
arts, which share with philosophical new materialisms 
an understanding of materiality as relative reliability 
(see Spatz 2015: 32, 42). From this perspective, the 
reliability with which one can return to a song over 
and over across many years, or track a gesture across 
hundreds of miles, justifies attributing to such things a 
degree of materiality. The fact that we cannot localize 
a song or movement at the physical, biological, or 
neurological level then only highlights the incom-
mensurability of diverse knowledge fields and the 
incompleteness of technoscientific approaches to 
embodiment.1
The relationship of a practitioner to specified 
materials A also potentially generates what I am 
calling a “space of practice,” indicated by square 
brackets []. As explained above, a space of practice 
need not be physically separated from the rest of the 
world, although, as countless descriptions of liminal 
1 In other words: If we cannot physically isolate a song within 
a body, we must conclude not that songs are immaterial, but 
that physics and biology incompletely map embodiment.
68
making a laboratory
and liminoid practice since Victor Turner (1969) 
suggest, spatial separation can be used to clarify and 
deepen the experience of entering and exiting such 
“spaces.” Whether or not the cut is spatialized, what 
distinguishes the frame of practice from the rest of life 
is its relationship to particular kinds of technique. This 
is very clear in situations like [AB], where the space 
of practice is organized around work on specified 
materials. It is less clear in an apparently improvised 
situation [AB], where two performers meet in a space 
of practice without being responsible for any particu-
lar material. But evidently, the difference between this 
meeting and any other interaction is based upon a 
shared sense of what it means to practice together. 
The two practitioners here could be two dance impro-
visers, two jazz musicians, or even a dancer and a mu-
sician improvising together. The difference between 
[AB] and [AB] should not be seen as a strict division 
between scripted and improvised performance, 
since no such clarity exists. Rather, it is a question of 
whether the lab design requires a practitioner to be 
responsible for introducing particular materials into 
the session. Take the example of a dancer and a musi-
cian improvising together. If we notate this as [AB], 
we are nominating the individuals as their whole 
selves, without specifying any particular material that 
they will be investigating. Each will necessarily draw 
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on their own training and expertise, but they may also 
feel free to respond to each other in ways that go be-
yond what they think of as their own practice. On the 
other hand, if particular choreographic and musical 
materials are specified as in [AB], then the practition-
ers’ overall approach will be more constrained, even 
if they are still improvising in relation to each other. 
Correspondingly, we can specify a configuration [AB] 
(illustrated in Figure 5), wherein one practitioner has 
specified materials and the other is improvising with 
and alongside their partner.
[] is a space of practice defined by a zone of tech-
nique, while _ is a specific chunk of material, whether 
notated or not. A space of practice is relatively broad 
in comparison to what we understand as practicable 
materials. In some circumstances a practitioner might 
lie down and take a rest, or even fall asleep, and 
still be understood as remaining within the space of 
practice. Although it is impossible to specify in general 
what counts as being inside or outside that space, it 
is not difficult to trace this demarcation across a wide 
range of embodied and performing arts. Practitioners 
are precisely those who have a shared sense of what it 
means to be doing a particular kind of practice. While 
any given division between inside and outside will be 
culturally specific, the basic fact of an inside/outside 





Figure 5. Relation of practitioners within a 
space of practice [AB]. Nazlıhan Eda Erçin 
(left) and Agnieszka Mendel (right) in the 
Judaica project, June 5, 2017. 
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least can be applied very widely. A particular dance 
happens within a space of dancing; a song happens 
within a context of singing or music; ritual actions are 
performed at an appropriate time and place; topics 
or ideas are discussed and debated within a discursive 
or institutional frame; embodied materials A can be 
distinguished from the space of embodied practice 
[A] in which they are invited to appear. By the same 
token, the singer initiates a space of song through the 
act of singing. The dancer, by dancing, transforms the 
space around them into a space of dance. One can 
recognize immediately the difference between practic-
ing a song, dance, or martial art in its designated 
space of practice and practicing some aspects of it in 
everyday life, such as by using breathing techniques 
to calm oneself in a stressful situation. The relation-
ship of the practitioner to the embodied material and 
to the space of practice involves both obligation, or 
“work,” and freedom, or “play.” Within the lab, the 
practitioner is required to practice, but also given the 
gift of being allowed to practice. Working with a song 
does not simply mean repeating it constantly, just as 
working on a character from a dramatic script may 
not be limited to speaking their scripted lines. One can 
work on a song by remembering it, thinking about it, 
inviting it, testing it out, or treading around it, even in 
silence. One can improvise in a space of practice, with 
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or without specified materials. dc notation does not 
specify how to work with embodied materials. This is 
exactly where, unlike many other forms of notation, dc 
notation does not make a cut.
Much more could be said about the _ and [] rela-
tions from the specific perspective of dc. Yet this might 
be superfluous here, since precisely these relations 
have been the focus of so much attention in theater 
and performance studies, from phenomenologies of 
dance and actor training to discussions of liminality 
and, more recently, immersivity. Most broadly, these 
relations can be analyzed in terms of technique 
(Spatz 2015), as well as through notions of habitus 
and performativity. I will therefore move on to what 
I consider the most challenging dc relation and that 
which most requires theorization: the < relation. The 
fact that < is the algebraic sign for inequality imme-
diately suggests a relation of hierarchy and unequal 
power. In fact, theorizing this relation will also allow 
us to reexamine the other three relations as distinctive 
modes of power and to draw an important distinction 
between power and hierarchy. Is a director one who 
commands and controls a situation? dc notation 
pushes against this assumption, not just in theory but 
practically, by removing from the director the most 
important power to which in modern and contempo-




dynamic configurations: elementsFigure 6. Primary external 
or “directorial” relation A<B. 
Agnieszka Mendel (left) and 
Nazlıhan Eda Erçin (right) in the 
Judaica project, May 4, 2017. 
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attached: the power to determine future practice. As 
defined by dc notation, the directorial relation has 
nothing to do with the power to decide what will be 
done at any future time. In other words, the director 
in dc is not responsible for composing or rehearsing 
any kind of score that the practitioner would then 
be obliged to reproduce later on. Cutting off the 
director from this overarching compositional power 
immediately grounds them in the temporality of the 
practitioner. Their role is reduced, or clarified, to that 
of making present interventions towards another 
person’s practice. Such present-tense directing is 
a craft or technique in its own right, which must be 
distinguished from the shaping of a final composi-
tion. While the potential for domination and abuse 
is always present, this clarification will allow us to 
understand the fundamental < relation in a different 
way, as an intensive relation of focus and care (see 
Figure 6), which can include directing in the sense 
of giving directions but can also incorporate other 
qualities such as watching, perceiving, witnessing, 
supporting, enabling, facilitating, questioning, inter-
vening, guiding, conducting, provoking, and more.
In the basic triangle configurations described 
above, when the director is outside the space of 
practice, this role is defined by its separation from 
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that space. The director does not join in with what the 
practitioner is doing, but relates to it from outside. If 
we wanted to get away from the hierarchical con-
notations of conventional directing, we could call this 
simply relational externality, or the primary external 
relation, a relation that is defined by its proximity-
with-externality to the space of practice. However, just 
as the space of practice does not have to be physically 
separate from the laboratorial frame in which it exists, 
the < relation does not have to be located physically 
outside the space of practice in order to be practically 
external. Cases of “directing from within” are common 
rather than exceptional. However, these situations do 
occasionally lead to comic or frustrating moments 
of confusion, when the externality of the directorial 
relation becomes indistinguishable from the relation 
between practitioners. A brief example illustrates this 
point: Think of a workshop in which a teacher has 
been leading by demonstration, with the participants 
copying their movements. At a certain point, the 
leader does something which is perceived as ambigu-
ous by the participants, or which the participants 
respond to in divergent ways. For example, the leader 
might gesture for the participants to come into a 
circle, only to have some of the participants copy or 
respond to the gesture itself, rather than following it as 
an instruction. The leader then has to clarify, probably 
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in spoken language: “No, don’t copy that gesture. I 
meant for you to come into a circle.” The point is that, 
if the other practitioners cannot tell the difference 
between an action that is part of the practice and one 
that is intended as an external instruction or com-
ment, then the relational structure collapses. Thus, the 
externality of the director does not ultimately rely on 
spatialization but on the mutually defined boundaries 
of shared practice []. In a configuration like [A>B], 
there is both a relation of shared embodied practice 
and a directorial relation. While the two relations may 
be closely intertwined, mixing them up will usually be 
experienced as a mistake.
With this in mind, I want to theorize the > relation 
in several steps, gradually developing an understand-
ing of this relation that far exceeds the conventional 
role of the director, choreographer, composer, or 
conductor in performing arts.2 I begin from Polish 
theater director and visionary Jerzy Grotowski’s 
lifelong investigations into the actor–director relation. 
2 In score-based music performance, the role of conductor 
is most structurally similar to that of director, because 
this person gives indications and instructions within the 
temporality of practice. However, this role may be narrowly 
constrained by the written score, embodied material _ that is 
often treated as a type of direction.
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As Kris Salata writes, Grotowski was most interested 
“in what uniquely can happen between two people” 
when they relate to one another through these roles 
(Colin and Sachsenmaier 2016: 183). Grotowski 
famously described this potentiality in the following 
highly evocative terms:
There is something incomparably intimate and produc-
tive in the work with the actor entrusted to me. He must 
be attentive and confident and free, for our labour is 
to explore his possibilities to the utmost. His growth 
is attended by observation, astonishment, and desire 
to help; my growth is projected onto him, or, rather, 
is found in him — and our common growth becomes 
revelation. This is not instruction of a pupil but utter 
opening to another person. (Grotowski 1982: 25)
Grotowski’s strong language and historical renown 
can lead one to read this passage as if it applies only 
to highly virtuosic or at least very long-term partner-
ships. Yet within dctv there is a “threshold” version 
of Grotowski’s approach to directing, a reduction of 
one of Grotowski’s major discoveries to a key techni-
cal element, which can then become a principle for 
widely varying practices. This key or threshold, which 
I have already mentioned, is the removal from the 
director the power to structure future practice. Once 
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the director role is divested of this power — such as the 
power to tell an actor to “keep” something between 
one session and the next — they become a “director 
without a future” and are free to dwell in the present 
moment of the embodied relation. This simple step 
immediately moves the actor–director relation into 
post-Grotowskian territory, where what might seem 
on the surface to be a strictly hierarchical relation 
actually manifests as a partnership of equals or peers.
The post-Grotowskian actor–director relation is 
conceived here as one of equality without symmetry. 
The partners accept a kind of polarization according 
to which each works in a different mode or zone. This 
polarization is defined by an agreement: that the 
primary site of practice and research will be located 
within the body of the performer. The resulting 
phenomenon of two people focused on one body also 
approaches universality in its breadth of application 
and could even be seen as a basic affordance of 
human existence. Whether the director offers instruc-
tions, invitations, questions, or poetic interventions, 
the < relation structures a partnership in which both 
partners are focused upon the body of just one of 
them. In performing arts, we are accustomed to this 
kind of directorial or choreographic impulse: the desire 
for someone else to make a certain movement, to 
speak in a certain way, or to perform a certain action, 
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which we tend to justify in terms of a future artistic 
composition. In pedagogical contexts, analogous 
impulses are described in terms of a process that is 
intended to benefit the student by increasing their 
knowledge or ability. Such motivations are essential 
to those contexts, but we misunderstand embodied 
relationality if we do not also recognize an aspect 
of desire, or even eroticism, that is unrelated to any 
future compositions or benefits and arises instead as 
an intuitive impulse that finds its primary meaning 
within the moment of encounter. In performing arts, 
this aspect of eroticism does not refer to anything 
sexual. Instead it implies that no pedagogical or 
compositional logic can fully account for the intuitions 
of the director towards the practitioner. One can 
never be entirely certain that what happens will in fact 
contribute to a future artistic work or provide a future 
benefit to a student. All one can be sure of, in the 
moment of practice, is the impulse itself, which arises 
from the encounter and presents itself at least partly 
as interpersonal desire.
To further theorize this relationality, I return to a set 
of analogies that I first developed in an earlier article 
(“This Extraordinary Power” [2010], reprinted in 
Spatz 2020), according to which the actor–director 
relation can be compared with that of the “bottom” 
and “top” in bdsm or kink culture. As just noted, this 
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analogy absolutely does not suggest a reduction 
of the < relation to sexuality, which is just one of the 
many zones of embodiment in which such impulses 
may arise. I turn to kink not to sexualize the < relation, 
but in search of a relevant ethics for it. In a society 
where sexual and gendered abuse is rampant, sub-
cultures that play sexually with power dynamics are 
immediately suspect, their practices easily conflated 
with real abuse. As a result, kinky communities have 
put tremendous effort into clarifying the difference 
between consensual exchanges of power and situ-
ations of abuse. That some people still confuse kink 
with abuse, or believe that the border between them is 
more vague than in other practices, is a symptom of a 
dominant culture that has not seriously grappled with 
its own patriarchy and misogyny. In fact, the stand-
ards of ethical kink, often summarized in the phrase 
“safe, sane, and consensual” (ssc) (Bauer 2014: 145), 
are arguably more rigorous than the implicit notions 
of consent that govern performing arts contexts. As a 
result, we can use kinky terms like “topping” and “bot-
toming” to think further about the interpersonal ethics 
of the < relation, and especially to understand how 
the “bottom” may be empowered by such dynamics.3
3 bdsm, or kink, is now a broad cultural phenomenon that 
goes far beyond what I can introduce here. Within some 
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In that earlier article, I compared the relationships 
that Grotowski developed with his most important 
performers to those that existed, on the one hand, 
between female medieval visionaries and their male 
spiritual directors in medieval European Christianity; 
and, on the other hand, to the roles of “top” and 
“bottom” in ethical kink — examining all of these 
through a queer feminist understanding of gender. In 
the medieval Christian context, the two polarized roles 
are entirely static with respect to gender: If a male 
visionary was uncommon, a female priest was impos-
sible. Grotowski’s work with his primary actors then 
suggests a partial queering of this dynamic, insofar 
as the actor–director configuration, while remaining 
interpersonally static (those practitioners never di-
kink communities, there are important distinctions between 
the “bottom,” the “sub(missive),” and other roles. I do not 
address these here. Similarly, in drawing on kink ideas and 
terminologies, I do not wish to offer a romanticized view 
of those scenes. Kinky relationships are no more inherently 
ethical than others. However, I contend that kink communities 
have developed valuable techniques for negotiating power 
relations, which can be applied to embodied arts more widely 
and which have a great deal to offer fields like commercial 
theater, which have grappled much less deeply with their own 




rected Grotowski), was most often mapped across the 
bodies of two men. In the example of contemporary 
kink culture, the configuration of dyadic roles is made 
fully “dynamic” in our sense, as “top” and “bottom” 
expressly signify polarized roles in contradistinction to 
gender. One can now specify male tops, female tops, 
male bottoms, female bottoms, and more recently 
also nonbinary tops and bottoms who do not fit into 
either binary gender.4 In each of these examples, 
I note that a specific kind of power accrues to the 
person who occupies the role of practitioner, actor, 
visionary, submissive, or “bottom,” that is, the person 
who becomes the embodied center or focal point of 
these laboratories of power. To situate this power 
and empowerment in more explicitly feminist terms, I 
now turn to a critical perspective on performance art 
offered by Rebecca Schneider.
4 bdsm is not inherently queer or feminist in this way, but it has 
the potential to be (Hale 1997; Weiss 2011; Bauer 2014). An 
accessible introduction to the idea of topping and bottoming, 
from which I borrow the concept of polarization, is offered by 
Easton and Hardy: “The nature of the dance of bdsm tends to 
polarize our roles to a greater extent than might be possible or 




Schneider examines “the space between masculin-
ized subject (given to know) and feminized object 
(given to be known)” through a close analysis of 
several female performance artists including Carolee 
Schneemann, Annie Sprinkle, Karen Finley, Ana 
Mendieta, and the Spiderwoman ensemble (1997: 
22). Schneider reads these artists, exemplified by 
Schneemann, as having seized the means of produc-
tion by which their bodies are objectified and com-
modified in patriarchal capitalism. Rather than merely 
switching to the role of director and to what Schneider 
identifies, following Jonathan Crary, as the external-
izing “techniques of the observer” (69), these artists 
actively “wrestle with the legacies of subjectivity and 
objectivity” (182), “explicating while illustrating” their 
own positionality (184), becoming a “political whore” 
or “unruly commodity” (108) who speaks out from the 
position of objectification. These artists’ simultane-
ous occupation of both object and subject positions 
leads to what Schneider calls “strategic binary 
explosion” (13) or the “strategic implosion of binaried 
distinctions” (18), wherein the practitioner becomes 
“both artist and object, both eye and body at once” 
(29). In our terms, these artists solve the problem of 
gendered hierarchization by integrating both sides of 
the < relation within their own body. We could write 
this as [A<A] or perhaps just [A<]. The practitioner 
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becomes their own director and, in this way, creates 
a new ethical-political position that straddles and 
explodes the < division or polarization.5
The unification of subject and object within a sin-
gle artist is one way of responding to the predicament 
of bodily objectification. Dynamic configurations work 
in a different way. Rather than rejecting hierarchy, 
dc further splinters these dualistic roles, detaching 
them from individual bodies and identities in order 
to systematically and strategically recombine them. 
Instead of combining practitioner and director in a 
single body, dc disaggregates some of the elements 
that constitute these roles and puts them into a more 
complex and fragmentary circulation. This is another 
way of defusing the potential for directorial abuse, 
without having to eliminate the role of the director or 
downsize to solo practice. According to Schneider, 
5 Further considerations of how gender constitutes itself 
technically can be found in the work of Talia Bettcher, 
who shows how gender is constituted by “interpersonal 
spatiality” in conjunction with the “differential distribution of 
vulnerability” and invulnerability across differently gendered 
bodies (Bettcher 2014). The specific potential that dctv 
affords for the practitioner to speak videographically from a 
position of structural vulnerability is discussed in the second 
half of this book.
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the static configurations of patriarchal capitalism 
ensure that communication and exchange “across the 
visual field cannot admit mutuality, reciprocity, or even 
complicity” (1997: 70). It then becomes the “project of 
postcolonial and cultural critical studies to ask: What 
can reciprocity look like? How can we do it?” (177). In 
dctv, the process of alternating between roles, as well 
as the basic premise of making these configurations 
explicit, works to produce mutuality, reciprocity, and 
complicity amongst the researchers by encouraging 
them to serve in each role as they would wish to be 
served. Most importantly, the powerful authorial func-
tion, the one who composes public works, is detached 
from the role of director and postponed to a later 
temporality in the role of editor (discussed below).
This is the sense in which, genealogically, dctv can 
be understood as a synthesis of post-Grotowskian 
experimental practice — in which the actor–director 
relation is seen as a valuable source of energy and 
knowledge — with a post-Judson, queer feminist 
approach to performance art, which has tended to 
reject the classical performer–director relation as 
intrinsically hierarchical if not intrinsically abusive. An 
actor, dancer, performer, or practitioner working with 
a director, choreographer, or similar figure undeniably 
experiences a particular kind of vulnerability. This vul-
nerability is structural, deriving from their commitment 
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to remaining focused on their own flow of practice 
while receiving and accepting interventions from 
someone whose body is not reciprocally focalized. 
There is an interpenetration of impulses emanating 
from two bodies, but the nexus of this interpenetra-
tion resides within one of those bodies, rather than 
in both, and this means that one of those bodies is 
more fundamentally at stake in the practice than the 
other. The terms “subject” and “object” are insuf-
ficient to name this mutuality for exactly the reasons 
Schneider provides: They are tied to a specific history 
of gendered and racialized capitalism and colonial-
ism and therefore do not suggest the range of positive 
potentialities that can also be found in historical 
and contemporary actor–director, visionary–priest, 
student–teacher, client–therapist, disciple–guru, 
bottom–top, and other such relations. Indeed, any 
theorization of the core dyad in terms of conventional 
or professional roles will likely be too reductive if our 
aim is to imagine the potential of the < relation in its 
widest possible sense. Therefore, at the risk of further 
digression, I will take this discussion one step further 
via the work of Giorgio Agamben.
If object–subject names the predicament in which 
we find ourselves as inheritors of European Cartesian 
modernity, then Giorgio Agamben’s term for a 
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possible way out of this philosophical and political 
trap is the pair zoe–bios. This pair of terms may help us 
conceptualize the < relation in a more abstract form, 
far removed both from the object–subject division and 
from actor and director as professions, and figured 
instead as what Agamben calls “an ontological rela-
tion.” In the earlier volumes of Agamben’s twenty-year, 
nine-volume Homo Sacer project (2017), zoe and bios 
are introduced as differing ancient Greek terms for 
life: the bare life (zoe) and the full political life (bios) 
of the citizen. In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life (1998), the paradigmatic site at which this 
distinction is drawn in modern times is the concentra-
tion camp. In the context of Nazi death camps as 
“laboratories in the experiment of total domination” 
(120), the generative capacities of embodiment, to 
which performing arts and embodied research are 
devoted, are hardly in evidence. It seems difficult then 
to establish any link between Agamben’s foundational 
focus on “the body’s capacity to be killed” (125) and 
our understanding of embodied research as a process 
that aims to unfold the plenitude of embodied capac-
ity. However, a more generative and nearly Grotowski-
an treatment of zoe can be retrieved from Agamben’s 
work. Traces of it appear briefly near the end of Homo 
Sacer, in the figure of the Roman priest Flamen Diale, 
for whom life is “an act of uninterrupted celebration 
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at every instant,” such that “all of the Flamen’s zoe has 
become bios; private sphere and public function are 
now absolutely identical” (1998: 183); as well as that 
of a certain biochemist who “decided to make his own 
body and life into a research and experimentation 
laboratory” (185). In both of these examples, as in 
those provided by Schneider, the zoe–bios tension is 
ethically resolved by uniting them within a single body. 
But Agamben further develops the positive potential-
ity of the zoe–bios relation in the final volume of Homo 
Sacer, The Use of Bodies (2016).
Agamben introduces his later examination of the 
zoe–bios relation through the ancient Greek under-
standing of the relation between master and slave. 
This reference to slavery is jarring for a contemporary 
reader, especially given that the definition of slavery 
and its specific historical link to colonialism and rac-
ism remain contested today (Beutin 2017). Agamben 
asserts that ancient Greek slavery “called for a 
conceptualization completely different from ours” 
and that this concept of the slave is not an oppressed 
laborer, but on the contrary a “human being without 
work who renders possible the realization of the work 
of the human being” (2016: 7, 22–23). It seems that 
what Agamben intends with the terms master and 
slave — linked to bios and zoe respectively — is not at 
all the dehumanizing violence of enslavement, which 
91
dynamic configurations: elements
derives from the permanent or static configuration of 
bodies locked into these roles. Instead, these terms 
point for Agamben toward a politics founded on 
another principle, such as the free circulation and 
equality of zoe and bios as distinct but complementary 
zones of power. If the words master and slave are not 
easily applied to such complementarity today, the 
exception is once again that of bdsm/kink culture, in 
which those terms are precisely detached from their 
static political meanings and allowed to circulate as 
zones of technique. In this sense, slavery as “juridical 
institution” can be understood as “the capture and 
parodic realization” of a prior, implicitly queer or kinky, 
use of the body (Agamben 2016: 78). Picking up an 
under-analyzed thread in Foucault’s life and work, 
Agamben describes bdsm as “a ritualized re-creation 
of the master/slave relation, insofar as this relation 
paradoxically seems to allow access to a freer and 
fuller uses of bodies […] beyond the subject/object 
and active/passive scissions” (35–36).6 Moreover, as 
6 The potential of bdsm already appears briefly in Homo 
Sacer — “Sadomasochism is precisely the technique of 
sexuality by which the bare life of a sexual partner is brought 
to light” (Agamben 1998: 134) — but it is much more fully 
examined throughout The Use of Bodies. Elsewhere, Agamben 
explores something like the < relation through reference to 
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an “experiment in fluidifying power relations,” bdsm 
“cannot fail to entail a transformation on the level of 
ontology.” Not ultimately about sex or even pleasure, 
Agamben asserts, the technique of kink, “with its two 
poles of mutual exchange, is an ontological relation” 
(107–8). It is therefore Agamben who gives us the 
most ambitious understanding of the < relation as 
that through which fundamental ontological dynam-
ics of life and embodiment might be explored.
The aim of Agamben’s master–slave relation is not 
only that the slave “renders possible the realization” 
of bios or political life for the master, but equally that 
the master enables the slave to enter deeply into the 
world of zoe, understood as the positive or generative 
landscape of bare life, flesh, or embodiment. What 
does it mean to dwell in zoe? On the one hand, this 
is a field of infinite potential, literally the (re)opening 
of the question of what a body can do. On the other 
hand, we can formulate it quite simply, reducing 
loaded concepts like plenitude and presence to 
ancient Greek theater and ethics, in terms of the relationship 
between the actor and the mask or persona, where the latter 
is understood as having been assigned by an author, and 
posits a “glorious” body that resembles nothing so much as a 




threshold techniques. When one is singing, dancing, 
acting out a character, or following a line of actions, 
one is displaced from techniques of externality, dis-
tancing, and observation. The more fully one enters 
into a zone of repeatable, embodied material, the less 
one’s attention remains on whatever else is happening 
nearby and elsewhere. The technique itself becomes 
its own world: a world of song or dance, of movement 
and play. Moreover, this world creates its own space 
into which others can enter. This is the positive sense 
of zoe, emerging here not as the traces of dignity 
under oppression — as in Alexander Weheliye’s (2014) 
important critique of Agamben — but in a context of 
rigorous care and attention. The difference between 
zoe–bios as conceived here and zoe–bios in places of 
deadly violence is then exactly the difference between 
kink and abuse, or bdsm and torture. Similar tech-
niques of restraint and command may be used, but 
the meanings are diametrically opposed because the 
valuation of zoe is reversed. Rather than the abjected 
and dirty animal body, this zoe is the cared-for animal 
body (Grotowski’s “organicity”), in relation to which 
the director temporarily holds a kind of stewardship.7 
7 The animal and ecological connection is appropriate here. 
Zoe in colonial modernity is abjected and “domesticated” 
(Hage 2017) along with all of nature, nonhuman animals, 
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What Agamben helps us to name is the way in which 
the < relation, when implemented as role or technique 
rather than as static identity, can — far from being a 
channel for abuse and oppression — enable the practi-
tioner to access potentialities that might never be 
found through even the best-integrated solo practice. 
In the context of artistic and embodied research, this 
suggests a need to reintegrate ethical approaches 
to power by carefully distinguishing their generative 
potential from that of exploitation.
There is much more to explore and contest in 
Agamben’s account of relationality and embodiment, 
as it pertains to embodied research, than can be ad-
dressed here. What we can immediately take forward 
is the challenge, which comes at the end of The Use 
of Bodies, to undertake “a radical transformation in 
the mode of conceiving the work of art” (2016: 245), 
based on a shift towards “deactivation” and “inopera-
tivity.” What I call embodied research is analyzed by 
Agamben under the sign of inoperativity, a mode of 
and ecology. But in the processes described here, it is instead 
protected, valued, and encountered as a respected other. 
There is then a sense in which the positive cultivation of 
zoe is intrinsically aligned with movements for ecological 




“relation with a pure potential in a work […] in which 
zoe and bios, life and form, private and public enter 
into a threshold of indifference” (247).8 In this mode, 
“the artist is no longer the author (in the modern, 
essentially juridical sense of the term) of the work nor 
the proprietor of the creative operation.” How can we 
accomplish such a “deactivation,” which transforms a 
teleological process into an open-ended one? If this is 
the promise of artistic research, through what forms 
8 There is no question that embodied research is precisely what 
Agamben arrives to at the end of his Homo Sacer project: 
“The reversal of the relation between organ and function 
amounts to liberating use from every established teleology. 
The meaning of the verb chresthai here shows its pertinence: 
the living being does not make use of its body parts (Lucretius 
does not speak of organs) for some one predetermined 
function, but by entering into relation with them, it so to speak 
gropingly finds and invents their use. The body parts precede 
their use, and use precedes and creates their function. / It 
is what is produced in the very act of exercise as a delight 
internal to the act, as if by gesticulating again and again the 
hand found in the end its pleasure and its ‘use’, the eyes by 
looking again and again fell in love with vision, the legs and 
thighs by bending rhythmically invented walking” (2016: 51). 
What is this, if not a description of “blue skies” embodied 




can it be realized? I suspect that the answer to this 
question has to do with how the powerful < relation 
is itself witnessed and intervened upon by forces and 
powers external to it. In performing arts, a rehearsal 
process is contained and given closure — in precisely 
the sense of a closing cut — by the requirement to 
produce a repeatable score that can be shown later 
to spectators who were not privy to the process out 
of which it emerged. This requirement is sometimes 
understood as ensuring that the pleasurable aspects 
of the process do not take over, leading to self-
indulgence. On the other hand, in abusive situations, 
the same requirement to produce a show may be used 
as justification to ignore the needs of practitioners. In 
the Christian religious context mentioned above, the 
assessment and protection of the disciple and their 
spiritual director would be referred to the church or to 
the divine.
In a dctv laboratory, with its two sets of cuts 
defined by two different kinds of archival inscription, 
none of these modes of closure are operative. There 
is no final public performance according to which 
the practice could be justified or critiqued. Instead, 
the dctv lab implements closure through a distinctly 
contemporary technology. To the core dyad formed by 
the < relation (which is surely as old as performance, 
as old as kink, as old as politics), we add another role 
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and relation: the videographic. The videographic 
relation (illustrated in Figure 7) is unlike the others in 
that it is defined by the use of a specific technology. 
While dc notation can be used without videogra-
phy — adding complexity and flexibility to rehearsals 
or workshops and/or with the use of other types of 
documentation such as writing, drawing, or audio 
recording — the full dctv method cannot be imple-
mented without transversal videography. This closing 
cut effects a major onto-epistemological change, 
fundamentally transforming what is happening in 
moments of experimental practice. From a post-
Grotowskian perspective, the crucial “betrayal” of the 
dctv approach — the abandonment of a principle 
that was previously considered fundamental — is not 
so much the introduction of the video camera into 
the intimacy of studio practice, but what this implies: 
namely, the elimination of the central principle of the 
repeatable performance score.9 Repetition in the 
sense of deepening technique of course does not go 
away, but the composition of a single, presentable 
score becomes superfluous once videography is fully 
integrated within the experimental practice.
A fuller discussion of transversal video will be the 
focus of the next section. To conclude this section, 





Figure 7. Videographic relation 
A/B. Nazlıhan Eda Erçin (left) 
and Ben Spatz (right) in the 
Judaica project, June 5, 2017.
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let us return to the idea of three roles suggested at 
the beginning and see how each of them can be 
understood in terms of a gamut of possibilities for 
action that range from minimal to maximal. The 
practitioner’s minimum is doing what counts as noth-
ing, taking a rest, even napping on the floor. Their 
maximum is dynamic flow, becoming so absorbed in 
their own world of practice that they are only mini-
mally receptive to external interventions. This range of 
potential is complemented by that of the director, who 
may match the energetic output of the practitioner 
or complement it. The director’s minimum is silent 
witnessing, without intervention, while their maximum 
would include frequent, forceful, or repeated inter-
ventions. Grotowski’s own practice as director and 
teacher offers a compelling illustration of this range, 
showing how both extremes may be used in different 
moments and contexts. 
Grotowski was well known for his capacity to 
observe endlessly, without intervention, waiting and 
watching for an impulse in the actor that would 
provoke a reciprocal impulse in himself. Recalling his 
longest and most extraordinary theatrical process, 
he wrote, “I had then only one rule: if someone is in 
action, in the course of a creative process, if he is not 
harming anyone, I may not understand anything, but 
I have to look. I have to let him do and for as long as 
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his need dictates, as long as he wants” (Grotowski 
2008b: 42). In other moments, however, Grotowski’s 
directorial force could be enormous. Thomas Richards 
recalls an early impression, during a workshop, in 
which Grotowski “entered the space like a volcano 
and began giving indications to the actor — again, 
again, asking him to repeat his score, driving the actor 
without any hesitation, like a rider guiding a horse” 
(Richards 2008: 3). Here we have both the minimum 
and the maximum of the directorial relation, complete 
with an animalization of the practitioner that invokes 
both the animality of zoe and the erotic dynamics of 
bdsm. Nor is it possible to understand Grotowski’s 
life and work without understanding that he pursued 
these two extremes — depth of witnessing and depth 
of intervention — perhaps more intensively than any 
other theatrical director in recent times. By expanding 
the range of his own directorial practice, he was able 
to expand in the same way the range of the practi-
tioner.
The videographer’s range of action is no less wide 
than those of the other roles. Their minimum includes 
turning the camera off. When the camera is on, the 
videographer can attempt to faithfully document the 
work of the practitioner (a task that always requires 
making some compositional choices) or, more 
actively, can choose to compose a flow of audiovisual 
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material that includes the practitioner, the director, 
the physical location, and whatever else may be in 
range. The videographer in dctv, freed from the kinds 
of control that dominate videography in commercial 
filmmaking, can develop their own embodied drama-
turgy within the shared temporality of the lab. 
Assuming that a session of laboratory work is 
defined by the presence of individuals occupying all 
three roles, such a session has its own dynamic range. 
All three roles might be at their minima: the practi-
tioner rests in stillness, the director watches silently, 
and the videographer waits patiently with the camera 
off. At another point, all three roles might be at their 
maxima: the practitioner is absorbed in a flow of prac-
tice, with the director making precise and effective 
interventions that provoke unexpected developments, 
while the videographer traces a line of audiovisual 
recording around and through the space of practice. 
Importantly, this maxima situation is not utopian. 
High intensity is not the same as intimacy or discovery; 
indeed, high intensity interaction may bring greater 
risk of unintentional harm, while developing trust and 
care may require periods of low intensity. Moreover, 
for each role, the range from minimum to maximum is 
not a simple linear spectrum, but a complex territory 
of energetic possibilities and emergent feedback 
loops, especially given the nonlinear ways in which 
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the roles interact with each other. Sometimes a calm, 
still, or silent director accompanies the most vigorous 
performance. Even within the scope of basic trio or 
triangle configurations, where one person occupies 
each role, there are vast energetic landscapes to be 
explored. More complex configurations offer still more 
varied possibilities and, of course, the space of pos-
sibility specified by any given configuration is uniquely 





Transversal Video:  
Somaticizing the Camera
The dynamic configurations described above, through 
the role of videographer and without requiring any 
secondary or external documentation strategy, gener-
ate what we can recognize as a new kind of audiovisu-
al material.1 To grasp the significance of this material, 
we need to consider the very different ways in which 
both live performance and performance documenta-
tion can bring closure to an experimental process. 
Katherine Profeta identifies the projects of Ralph 
Lemon, on which she has long worked as dramaturg, 
as laboratories: “Performance was a laboratory for 
everything else: ontology, epistemology, anthropol-
1 Here, as above, “material” refers to the relative reliability of 
audiovisual data — that which makes it possible to watch, edit, 
replay, and transmit — rather than to a notion of materiality 
grounded in mechanical physics.
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ogy, sociology, politics. I understood ‘performance 
as research’ before that phrase took on its current 
cachet” (Profeta 2015: xi). I quote here at length a 
passage in which Profeta observes the inadequacy of 
the conventional closing cut of performing arts — the 
staging of a more or less repeatable work before an 
audience understood as public — when it comes to 
tracing the content of such laboratoriality:
[I]t is possible for intercorporeal work to be radical 
on a radically small scale. If the knowledge gained 
in the rehearsal room is not effectively disseminated, 
the collaboration will have been very meaningful for a 
very small number of people. Its impact could easily be 
limited to the owners of the bodies in question. And thus 
the dance dramaturg, spending her time thinking about 
intercorporeal exchange, still eventually shifts back to 
that old question of audience. How might other bodies, 
beyond those bodies in the room, feel the reverberations 
of this physical work? Could simply demonstrating the 
results ever be enough? […]
One response to that question is to demonstrate 
more than just results. This relates to my gut feeling that 
the dialogues, tensions, and provisional solutions of 
our process, all of which I was attempting to archive in 
my notebook, were always going to be more interest-
ing than any scene we might stage inside a proscenium 
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frame. It likewise relates to Ralph’s decision to publish 
his artists’ journals on the Trilogy’s process and to 
publicly define the Trilogy not as a collection of three 
proscenium stage events but as the larger constella-
tion of performance events, research events, visual art 
installations, journal writing, cast interviews, and the 
unruly work that wove them all together. By a simple act 
of public redefinition — declaring that the larger process 
and all its many by-products were, collectively, the 
product — Ralph did much to shift thinking, within the 
rehearsal room, among his presenters, and among his 
long-term audiences.
Yet it nevertheless cannot be denied that the 
economics supporting all this process dictated that the 
largest number of people experiencing the work would 
be experiencing whatever part we put forward on the 
proscenium stage. (205)
The more a practice relies on dynamic interactions 
of the kind described in the previous section, the 
less adequately the cut of live performance will be 
able to trace its discoveries. Indeed, the idea that 
live performance can be a “work” like a painting or 
a sculpture depends upon a complete objectifica-
tion of the performer in relation to the audience, as 
if what is being witnessed were not a chunk of life 
at all, but some kind of static object. This does not 
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mean that live performance is without value. The 
question, rather, is what such events are understood 
to accomplish. Making live public performance the 
closing cut for an experimental process ensures that 
experimentality — the openness to the unknown that 
defines the epistemic integrity of a process — cannot 
be prioritized. Instead, experimentality is channeled 
into rehearsal, in the sense of preparation for a more 
substantive event that can only take place once the 
audience arrives. A live performance is a moment, 
an event, an encounter. If it unfolds with most of the 
people present in the passive role of audience, that is 
only because of specific, often Eurocentric, histories of 
presentation and spectatorship. If, on the other hand, 
we want to prioritize the epistemic or research dimen-
sions of embodied practice, then the closing laborato-
rial cut needs to be implemented transversally across 
that practice. This requires us to implement a different 
kind of cut, one that can be made transversally from 
the beginning to the end of the process. In the dctv 
method, that cut is audiovisual.
Transversal video is, first of all, a turn away 
from performance documentation. Performance 
documentation brings archival stability to the closing 
cut of live performance, producing an inscription 
that captures some aspects of the live performance 
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event. As debates over liveness and documentation 
have shown (Phelan 1993; Auslander 1999; Reason 
2006; D. Taylor 2007), this means that performance 
documentation is always asymptotically chasing what 
it can never have, namely the wholeness of the live 
event as experienced by those who were present. This 
remains true even when new technologies like motion 
capture and digital animation are brought to bear 
on performance practices (Delahunta and Whatley 
2013; Jürgens and Fernandes 2018). One can set up 
the most interesting event in the world, but if one’s 
closing cut does not manage to trace what is interest-
ing about it, then those aspects cannot be shared or 
assessed by anyone who is not physically present. One 
avenue of exploration suggested by this impossibility 
is the desire to collapse the fourth wall and bring the 
audience into the space of practice, a transformation 
that can range from the spatial (immersive theater) to 
the interactive (participatory theater) to the epistemo-
logical (applied theater). Frank Camilleri has recently 
called for a “post-psychophysicality” that “actively 
embraces” new technologies and would be “engaged 
in working with (thus relating rather than eschewing 
or bypassing) aspects of the real made perceptible 
and possible through new technologies” (Camilleri 
2015: 121). Yet for Camilleri and others, the synthesis 
of video and theater still seems beholden to the 
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assumption of a public theatrical event as the closing 
cut of these processes. Here, I am more interested 
in alternative cuts. If neither live performance nor 
performance documentation can adequately trace 
the emergent discoveries of experimental practice and 
embodied research, then what alternative closing cuts 
might be implemented and how might this transform 
the entire endeavor? More simply, if we do not docu-
ment performance events, then what do we document?
“Transversal” means that the cut is made laterally 
across the entire research process. This is true first of 
all in a temporal sense: Audiovisual traces are pro-
duced on the first day of laboratorial practice in the 
same way as on the last and, even though the latter 
may benefit from many discoveries along the way, in 
retrospect the former may well be uniquely interesting 
in their own right. Such a transversal cut effects a 
horizontalization of the research process, displacing 
any cumulative embodied work that might eventually 
be documented with a potentially unlimited quantity 
of audiovisual output, a new kind of audiovisual data. 
A parallel transversality also applies spatially, in that 
the videographer is invited — once the initial spatial 
mapping of the roles has been abandoned — to 
enter physically into the space of practice. Again, 
this marks a significant deviation from conventional 
performance documentation, which tends to locate 
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the camera physically outside the space of practice in 
order to replicate the perspective of a live spectator. 
Transversal videography abandons the closure of the 
work both temporally and spatially, cutting into and 
across what would usually, from a performance docu-
mentation perspective, be treated as a closed object. 
Moreover, in addition to such temporal and spatial 
transversality, there is also an epistemic transversality, 
which changes the very definition of that which is 
documented.
Transversal video does not provide a more 
faithful, objective, or comprehensive trace of any 
given moment of practice or performance. Instead, 
it jettisons the desire for objectivity as externality and 
brings videography inside the research process. The 
role of the videographer is extremely powerful, insofar 
as it has the most direct influence on the audiovisual 
traces generated by the research. However, this role 
is not all-powerful and its control over the audiovisual 
output is limited by the same factors that limit the po-
tential tyranny of the director: First, the videographer 
is not in charge of what happens, but only of what 
is recorded, which is necessarily delimited by what 
happens. Second, the videographer has no special 
privilege when it comes to making editorial choices 
about how to publish the recorded material (just the 
opposite, in fact — see below). Third, the role of the 
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videographer circulates dynamically within the re-
search team, so that videographic power is separated 
from the power of any individual. The audiovisual 
material generated by dctv is best understood as 
rigorously co-authored within the temporality of an 
experimental practice session. Without the interacting 
choices and actions of all participants in a configura-
tion, the audiovisual material could not exist. And 
because this temporality is rigorously separated from 
that of the editor, these audiovisual documents stand 
on their own as a kind of experimental or even empiri-
cal research data.
Transversality has a long history in film and video. 
Journalistic and documentary film, experimental and 
ethnographic film, and reality television have all made 
use of mobile cameras that cut through a space to 
produce a transversal tracing of a complex event as it 
unfolds. Transversal approaches to cinema developed 
alongside the birth of the medium (Vertov 1984) and 
continue through visual ethnography (Rouch 2003; L. 
Taylor 2014), experimental filmmaking (Geuens 2001; 
Mouëllic 2013), and the “film essay” (Papazian and 
Eades 2016). Psychological and sociological research 
methods have also used audiovisual recording in a va-
riety of ways to produce experimental data (Knudsen 
and Stage 2015; Vannini 2015), a process explored 
further in transversal accounts of durational artistic 
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research (Arlander 2018). Recent technologies such 
as body-mounted action cameras and 360° cameras 
have extended the capacities of video as a research 
tool, leading some ethnographic researchers to “focus 
on the notion of the video trace: the idea that such 
cameras do not so much offer us the possibility to 
objectively capture the world as it appears in front 
of the camera lens, but instead record a video trace 
through the world as created by our movement in 
specific environmental, sensory and affective configu-
rations” (Cruz, Sumartojo, and Pink 2017: 39). Today, 
video is increasingly used as a research method across 
the social sciences and beyond (Harris 2016).
The dctv research method can be contextualized 
alongside these developments insofar as it relies upon 
the epistemological power of recording technolo-
gies to access practice in a way that combines the 
archival capacity of an inscriptive medium with the 
audiovisuality of embodiment. Nor is there anything to 
prevent a dctv lab from working with body-mounted 
cameras or other more recent recording technologies. 
However, the specificity of dctv does not reside in any 
particular recording technology, but rather in the way 
these are deployed within an experimental practice 
that is structured by dynamic configurations. It is the 
dynamic circulation of videographic power across 
bodies and in relation to other modes of power that 
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gives dctv’s audiovisual outputs their epistemological 
status. In particular, the de-linking of both directorial 
and videographic power from editorial and authorial 
power gives dctv a specific kind of experimental rigor. 
The strict separation of the temporality of the lab 
from that of editing works against deeply ingrained 
assumptions about what it means to make a film or 
video. In some approaches to experimental film-
making, transversal videography is directed at the 
life of the filmmaker, either through archival footage 
or self-documentation (Gaycken in Papazian and 
Eades 2016: 256-74). In others, improvisation is 
allowed — empowering actors to respond spontane-
ously and in some cases thereby also transforming 
the work of the videographer — yet the process is 
still controlled overall by a director who retains 
final authorial power (Mouëllic 2013). New critical 
approaches to ethnography may go even further in 
distributing directorial and editorial power, aiming 
to develop “an ethics for working toward thoroughly 
collaborative film and video research” (Harris 2012: 
14) similar to that proposed here, yet without this 
distributive ethics reaching all the way into the means 
of production and the structure of encounter.2 dctv is 
2 The “ethnocinema” proposed by Harris as a synthesis of 
ethnography and arts-based research (2012: 145–48) may 
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recognizably unique in the extent to which it disag-
gregates powers and roles, both within the shared 
interactive temporality of the lab and between the 
temporalities of experimental practice and of editing. 
This disaggregation owes everything to embodied 
research in collaborative creation, which has been 
conducted in fields of experimental theater and dance 
and of which most filmmakers and social science 
researchers remain unaware.
Each individual in a dctv configuration is empow-
ered to act freely within a particular domain, but none 
are in charge of the overall meaning of what happens. 
There is no final authority on what happens, what is 
audiovisually traced, or what might later become a 
publishable work. The videographer is empowered to 
make a videographic tracing of a particular moment 
come closest to dctv in its ethics. This is a research method 
developed from the idea “that films made collaboratively are 
documents of relationship and are not representative of whole 
communities, ‘authentic’ individuals or unassailable ‘truths’ 
and that they trouble the very notion of authenticity itself” (14, 
italics original). The alternative and experimental narrative 
films studied by Mouëllic, on the other hand, demonstrate 
how actors and videographers can be partially empowered 
to improvise while still remaining firmly within the grip of 
autocratic or even abusive directorial control (2013: 121–29).
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of practice. They make a series of cuts, first quite liter-
ally by turning the camera on or off. (The camera then 
also makes its own cuts, at 30 or more photographic 
frames per second and perhaps 44,100 audio sam-
ples per second.) The decisions of the videographer 
are at once momentous and mundane, determining 
which moments of practice will be audiovisually 
traced and how. Once the camera is on, a variety of 
videographic choices become available through the 
physical movement of the camera as well as shifts in 
focus, zoom, and other parameters. Once the roles 
are no longer rigidly spatialized, as described above, 
the videographer is free to move around, between, 
through, and even away from the practitioner(s) and 
director. This allows the mobile, active camera of the 
videographer to cut through space both visually and 
sonically. The visual effect of the moving camera is 
obvious, but its parallel auditory effect can be equally 
significant. Both the visual and audio tracks of the 
resulting audiovisual material trace not a separable 
object, but a set of shifting relations between the 
videographer and the interactions unfolding around 
them.
In the dctv labs I have led, the active engagement 
of the videographer has often extended towards 
a kind of athleticism resembling that of the practi-
tioners. This is not only because the videographer 
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responds to their movement, but also because the 
circulation of roles over time means that whatever 
physical skills are cultivated by the researchers as 
practitioners will gradually permeate their work as 
videographers. However, intensive videographic en-
gagement does not have to be realized through physi-
cal movement, just as the work of the practitioner(s) 
need not be athletic or virtuosic. A videographer who 
is not able to move quickly in the space, or carry a 
heavy camera, can produce tracings that are just as 
epistemically valid and potentially valuable. Perhaps, 
then, rather than an “athleticism” of the videographer, 
a more appropriate term would be that suggested by 
Maria Kapsali when she referred to the dctv method 
as a way of “somaticizing the camera.”3 As I have 
3 The Judaica project lab worked with a professional 
photographer and videographer in 2017, inviting him to 
move around in the studio with us while holding a moderately 
heavy dslr camera (Nikon D750). His first comment after 
working with us was that he found it exhausting and that, 
as a videographer, he had not expected to be undertaking 
constant physical labor over several hours, as the three 
researchers in the project team often were. Kapsali used the 
phrase “somaticizing the camera” during a 2017 Judaica 
project event at the University of Leeds. For a related 
investigation in visual anthropology, see Claire Loussouarn’s 
guided practice audio track “Dancing with the Camera” in the 
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emphasized throughout, the crucial distinction here 
does not depend on any particular skill, but on the 
way in which the roles are conceptualized through 
dynamic configurations and the kinds of relationality 
this generates. Recording technologies in dctv do not 
arrive from elsewhere to document a prior constituted 
event, or even a prior constituted ensemble, but 
instead are fully metabolized within the space and 
process of the laboratory, leading to a new way of 
relating to and handling the camera.
As with the role of director, the videographer does 
not need to have any special skills in order to enter 
into the particular ethics of relationality that define 
dctv. They only need to be detached from the future 
power of the editor and thereby grounded within the 
shared temporality of practice, within which each 
member of the team is empowered to be creative but 
not to control. This shift makes it difficult to distinguish 
“good videography” in two different senses: one linked 
to the kinds of purely audiovisual qualities with which 
we are all now so familiar through movies, television, 
and advertising, and another referring to video that 
has a meaningful relationship to unfolding events, 
regardless of its independent audiovisual quality. 
online Somatics Toolkit (http://somaticstoolkit.coventry.ac.uk/
loussouarn-dancing-with-the-camera/).
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Aesthetic and epistemic choices become inseparable 
and the usual standards by which audiovisual mate-
rial is judged are displaced, although not disregarded. 
This onto-epistemological shift will become clearer 
in my discussion of the editor role below, but a simple 
comparison of two extremes may be useful here. First, 
of course, there are some “audiovisual moments” in 
which everything seems to come together: Bodies, 
actions, and meanings are traced in a recording 
wherein color, image, sound, and movement are strik-
ingly composed. This may be due to the expert skill 
of the videographer, who manages to pay attention 
simultaneously to what is happening and what is 
being recorded, so that the latter captures the former 
with as much richness as the audiovisual medium 
allows. Or it may be a happy accident, a wonderful 
coincidence of technology and moment. On the other 
hand, it can happen that an extraordinary moment 
of practice is traced only roughly or glancingly by the 
recording device. The audio track may be noisy or 
clipping, the image jumpy or out of focus. Yet in the 
context of an important moment, such material can-
not be judged purely on aesthetic grounds. Instead, it 
may be more like a fragment of documentary footage, 
such as a recording made accidentally within range of 
a momentous event. (The Zapruder film is a famous, 
forensic example.) This kind of material may require 
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more editorial work in order to become legible, but its 
overall value is no less for its poor audiovisual quality. 
Because dctv is simultaneously aesthetic and episte-
mological, the most valuable footage it produces may 
not be the most visually or sonically effective.
As these examples reveal, the distinctive quality 
of dctv’s videographic outputs is not ultimately au-
diovisual at all. While one can point to videographic 
choices that arose from momentary complicity and 
might not have been conceived by an external direc-
tor or videographer, there is no strictly videographic 
technique available to the videographer in dctv 
that could not in theory also be used in conventional 
cinema. Indeed, there are many ways in which tem-
poral, spatial, and even epistemic transversality can 
be faked, so that audiovisual material is generated to 
look as if it arose from an experimental context when 
it was, in fact, precisely planned. The difference is 
onto-epistemological: It is a difference in the prove-
nance of the material — how it was generated — which 
translates to a difference in its potential, in what 
can be done with it. The fact that one could stage a 
rehearsed moment in such a way as to make it look as 
if it were produced by dctv is analogous to the fact 
that one can make beautiful charts whether or not 
the underlying data is accurate. The epistemological 
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value of a beautiful or compelling graphic display of 
data resides in its ability to convey the meaning of the 
data it visualizes, which cannot be separated from 
its effectiveness as a visual image. Composition is 
important, but only in relation to the question of what 
happened. This means that, in editing and reworking 
dctv’s audiovisual materials, while we can feel free to 
draw upon all the design techniques of contemporary 
video editing, each technique must be reinvented 
from the ground up, in relation to the specific onto-
epistemology of dctv.4
At the beginning of the first dctv laboratory 
process, we asked ourselves: Does the camera change 
4 An intriguing question, beyond the scope of this book, is 
what it might look like to analyze narrative cinema from 
the perspective of dctv. This seems to have the potential 
to open a radically different mode of analysis, one in which 
even mainstream films are no longer treated as coherently 
authored works, like books, with the director in the position of 
author, but instead could be analyzed in terms of collaborative 
dynamics and fractional identities. Where the auteur director 
exercises strict control over the performer, videographer, and 
editor, we might now see this as a specifically narrow and 
restrictive approach that actually conceals and prevents us 
from accessing what is most interesting in the work, namely 
the divergence in perspectives amongst the co-authors as 
enacted through their various roles.
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what happens in the space? Does its presence make 
us behave differently? Later on, others asked us the 
same question. This question is understandable, but it 
is a red herring. Asking how the camera changes the 
practice puts us back in the domain of performance 
documentation and the familiar subject–object split, 
according to which the freedom of practitioner and 
director ought not to be affected or influenced by the 
presence of the camera. Instead, we should be asking: 
How does the camera, as a closing cut defined by 
a particular kind of archival inscription, participate 
in the construction of meaning in this laboratorial 
space? As Barad writes: “Which cuts are enacted” is 
“not a matter of choice in the liberal humanist sense; 
rather, the specificity of particular cuts is a matter of 
specific material practices through which the very no-
tion of the human is differentially constituted” (2007: 
217).5 In the method described here, the human 
5 Rheinberger makes the same point, focusing on technologies 
of archival inscription rather than the more abstract notion 
of the cut: “The research laboratory is a place where new 
knowledge comes into being leaving behind it a trail of rough 
notes, scrips and scribbles, and revised write-ups that offer 
insight into concrete processes of knowledge formation” 
(2010: 244). These are “graphematic traces” that, following 
Derrida, “have the capacity to become detached not only 
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(and not only the human) is constituted through a 
closure that is fundamentally audiovisual: audiovisual 
embodiment or the audiovisual body. The audiovisual 
body in dctv is not the same as that produced by the 
cinema industry, reality television, documentary films, 
surveillance cameras, or video art. For all its variation 
and history, the history of audiovisual recording has 
been dominated by those who control the recordings 
generated by these technologies. With few excep-
tions, the people whose bodies are traced by record-
ings — whether professional actors or ethnographic 
subjects — have had little control over what is done 
with their audiovisual bodies. In most cases, the 
person designated as director is charged with direct-
ing not only performers but also videographers (or 
from their initial referent, that to which they originally 
referred, but also from the one who writes, the one who 
produces the trace.” They “lie between the materialities of 
experimental systems and the conceptual constructs that 
leave the immediate laboratory context behind in the guise of 
sanctioned research reports” (245). The difference between 
Barad and Rheinberger is again instructive: While the idea 
of the onto-epistemological cut is powerful, the relationship 
between this cut and specific technologies of archival 




cinematographers) and editors. dctv disaggregates 
these powers and in this way constitutes a radically 
different audiovisual body. Yet the power to cut, edit, 
frame, and publish that body cannot be eliminated, 
it can only be postponed. After any dctv lab session 
has finished, the question of what can be done with 
the resulting audiovisual materials brings us into a 
different temporality and role: that of the editor.
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Transversal Video:  
The Editor Function
As noted above, dynamic configurations can be used 
to structure practice without transversal video, if the 
videographer role is removed or replaced. Similarly, 
transversal videography has often been implemented 
without dynamic configurations. But the combination 
of these two cuts in dctv leaves behind a particular 
kind of audiovisual material. This material is intimate-
ly linked to the individuals who produced it, while also 
having significance independently of them, insofar as 
it does not claim to represent “what happened” ob-
jectively, but only as a particular audiovisual tracing 
produced by the intersection of multiple contributions. 
The question of what can be done with this material 
must be asked across several registers: technological, 
legal, ethical, political, and so on. On a technological 
level, the material can be edited and widely shared 
with increasing ease, thanks to the availability of 
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desktop video editing software and internet stream-
ing platforms. While editing and publishing videos is 
not yet as technologically accessible as writing and 
distributing textual documents, the gap between 
these types of media grows ever narrower. From the 
perspective of a university or other institution, the 
material generated by dctv falls somewhere between 
artistic production and research data, which may be 
treated differently by intellectual property law. The 
system of contracts that determines legal relations 
between members of the research team and their host 
institution may or may not map easily onto the ethical 
commitments researchers feel towards each other 
or their political commitments. All of these potential 
contradictions meet at the editing desk.
The epistemological rigor of dctv arises largely 
from its postponement of the compositional power 
that organizes artistic and knowledge production, 
which Foucault famously called the “author function” 
(1984). Banishing this power from the laboratory 
allows the dynamic configurations to produce a 
genuinely experimental event, within which the author 
function is postponed and all participants meet 
together in the temporality of emergent interaction. 
However, the author function cannot be fully dis-
solved in any project that engages with contemporary 
cultural and political contexts, especially if it aims 
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to produce circulating documents or works. The 
videographic materials generated by dctv labs are 
extraordinarily rich as well as radically open-ended. 
The question of how to organize and edit them, as 
well as how and where to publish or share them, is 
displaced from the temporality of the lab only to 
return later with a distinct temporality of its own: that 
of the “editor function” or the role of the video editor. 
This is another role, another power, which is parallel in 
some way to the roles and relations defined previously, 
but which exists in a separate temporality from that 
of the dc-based laboratorial practice. The editor has 
the power not only to select and order fragments of 
audiovisual material but also to juxtapose these with 
textual and spoken language and other materials. 
It is well-known that juxtaposing even a single word 
with an image can radically alter the meaning of both 
(Rancière 2007). Titles and subtitles, voiceovers, an-
notations, and other layers of textuality and montage 
can entirely transform the meaning of a video docu-
ment. The dctv editor, therefore, unlike editors who 
merely implement a prior directorial vision, has the 
power to make fundamental choices about meaning.
The editor’s choices in this context are epistemic. 
They are not merely different ways of representing 
what happened in the lab, but more like a distinct 
mode of writing or thinking, with the responsibility 
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to craft meaning from experimentally generated 
audiovisual materials. Catherine Grant, quoting 
Annette Michelson, has described the feeling of “ludic 
sovereignty” that she experiences at the editing table, 
when crafting video essays as a form of film criticism.1 
Working with extracts of well-known movies, Grant 
describes how the “experience of repeatedly handling 
the sequence in and out of its original context” led 
to “new affective knowledge” (2014: 52–54). The 
care with which Grant describes handling these 
audiovisual materials, and the affective charges they 
1 On videographic film criticism, see the Vimeo group 
Audiovisualcy (https://vimeo.com/groups/audiovisualcy) and 
the online journal [in]Transition (http://mediacommons.org/
intransition/). It is interesting to note that, although there are 
more and more videographic journals, apart from my own 
Journal of Embodied Research (http://jer.openlibhums.org/), 
these do not focus on embodiment. That we do not think of 
video as being intrinsically linked to embodiment tells us which 
side of the camera has historically held structural power. If 
we were to assume that the person who is recorded owns the 
recording — rather than the person holding the camera — then 
we would have to think of video as a medium that is deeply 
and fundamentally related to embodiment. Instead, most of 
the work that understands video as a medium for thought 
locates this thought in the work of the videographer, director, 
or editor, rather than that of the embodied practitioner.
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carry, resonates with the task of the dctv editor to 
frame and contextualize experimentally generated 
audiovisual data. Yet the dctv editor is working with 
audiovisual material that they themselves have co-
generated as part of an experimental configuration. 
Even more importantly, the dctv editor is creating 
what is likely to be the first and perhaps the only 
public form these materials will take. Whereas the 
audiovisual film essayist is creating a secondary work 
that in no way displaces its (usually better known and 
higher status) object of analysis, the dctv editor is 
actively shaping the primary output of the laboratory 
process. The choices they make about how to com-
pose this material may therefore become definitive of 
its meaning in the public sphere, making the respon-
sibility of the dctv editor in some ways more similar 
to that of a visual ethnographer. Overall, the work of 
the dctv editor combines elements of both the ludic 
play found in videographic film criticism and the sense 
of responsibility associated with ethnographic video, 
without being reducible to either of these.
A comprehensive breakdown of video editing tools 
that might be used by such an editor is beyond the 
scope of this book. As noted above, the full range of 
editing techniques wielded by contemporary video 
editors is available to the dctv editorial role, with the 
caveat that the meaning of these techniques must be 
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reworked and rediscovered in relation to the specific 
nature of the material being edited. Certainly, there 
is a huge range of possibilities between simple and 
complex editing strategies. In the context of a newly 
constituted dctv lab, it might be wise to begin from 
the narrowest and most restricted palette of editorial 
choices, in order to gradually uncover and face the 
ethical, political, and hermeneutic issues that the pro-
cess raises. In the first complete dctv lab process, the 
team’s initial publication was an online catalogue of 
clips to which strict limitations on editorial power were 
applied. The editorial stage in this process consisted 
of just two steps for each item in the catalogue: first, 
the selection of a single uncut fragment of audiovisual 
material, and second, the choice of a title for that 
fragment. Each item in the Songwork Catalogue 
(Spatz, Erçin, and Mendel 2017) is uncut in the sense 
that there are no editorial interventions between the 
“in” and “out” points. One benefit of this approach 
is that each item could be approved through a fully 
collaborative process. Because they each only involve 
three editorial choices — in-point, out-point, and 
title — the research team could discuss those for as 
long as needed to reach consensus. Most often the 
initial set of choices was proposed by a single person, 
but the whole trio could then debate, if necessary, 
until consensus was reached. This sometimes involved 
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moving the in-point or out-point, revising the title, or 
even rejecting a proposed selection. As a result of this 
process, the Songwork Catalogue is fully co-authored 
in a way that corresponds to the co-authorship of the 
lab work underpinning it.2 Taken together, the more 
than three hundred clips in the Songwork Catalogue 
offer an epistemologically rigorous transversal 
window onto six months of full-time dctv practice.
Much more is possible once the editor is freed to 
make use of additional video editing tools. Initially 
this might be limited to a chronological montage 
of single-session materials: the selection of multiple 
excerpts from a single practice session, which allows, 
for example, a three-hour lab session to be condensed 
into a much shorter video essay. To allow greater 
complexity, such limits can be abandoned as excerpts 
from multiple sessions can be used or the chronologi-
cal ordering of moments can be broken. Multiple 
visual fragments, as well as photographs and other 
images, can be juxtaposed within a single frame, 
using visual cues such as size and position to establish 
2 This co-authorship applies to Songwork I, II, and III, the main 
sections of the Songwork Catalogue, which curate selections 
from the 2017 Judaica project laboratory. Songwork 0 is a 
selection of clips from my earlier projects, which include many 
other co-authors who did not participate in the editing phase.
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a relationship between them. Audio layers can also 
be combined, although superimposed audio tracks 
are not as perceptually separable as juxtaposed 
images. Voiceovers provide a common if mundane 
way to introduce additional perspectives and contexts 
around audiovisual material. Beyond this, a whole 
world of editorial framing is afforded by the pos-
sibility of layering written text alongside or on top of 
audiovisual materials. While a video’s actual title sits 
outside the audiovisual work and names it more or 
less concisely, the audiovisual medium can hold all 
manner of textuality within its frame, from title cards 
(as in old silent movies) and subtitles or captions to 
vertically or horizontally scrolling text; or even textual 
annotations intentionally placed within the frame. 
The color, size, and position of text in relation to the 
audiovisual material involves its own semiotics. Finally, 
the editor has the power to open up the audiovisual 
form to all manner of other sources, from archival 
footage to contemporary cinema and journalism. 
Through such a choice, dctv-generated material 
can be set alongside other materials circulating in 
today’s audiovisual universe and within film and video 
history.3
3 All of these techniques except the last have been explored in 
video essays generated by the Judaica project. The project’s 
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Once edited, video documents can be placed in 
digital archives, submitted to peer review, made avail-
able for citation, and posted publicly online, where 
they instantly become available to millions of viewers. 
Ethical, political, and legal frameworks for intellectual 
property are increasingly ambiguous or contradic-
tory in the digital age, often failing to make sense 
of the new modes of copying and creation afforded 
by the internet (Coombe 1998; Coombe, Wershler, 
and Zeilinger 2014; David and Halbert 2014). One 
of the generative possibilities of dctv is its ability to 
speak back to these discourses from the perspective 
of experimental practice as understood in performing 
and embodied arts. In this context, we bring to wider 
audiovisual debates a commitment to honor what 
I call the “contestable privilege” of the practitioner-
researcher (Spatz 2020: 116) as someone who moves 
between various positions in the creative process: 
practitioner, director, videographer, editor. While this 
commitment has precedents in video art and artistic 
research, the disaggregation of roles in dctv allows 
first two peer-reviewed video articles are Spatz, Erçin, Gatt, 
and Mendel (2018) and Spatz, Erçin, Mendel, and Spatz-
Rabinowitz (2018). For an updated collection of Judaica 




us to examine the ethics of audiovisual co-authorship 
in greater detail and perhaps also to contest conven-
tional editorial hierarchies by prioritizing the ethical 
relationships that obtain between these roles. Accord-
ingly, one might begin from an ethics of vulnerability 
whereby the practitioner — the one whose audiovisual 
body is most explicitly featured in the videographic 
trace — has priority when it comes to editorial power. 
In other words, we could assume that in dctv the 
editor function is first assumed by the individual who 
occupies the role of practitioner in the footage being 
edited. The foregrounding of vulnerability is first an 
ethical premise, but then also an epistemological 
claim, owing much to feminist standpoint theory 
and the notion of first-person authority (Bettcher 
2009); and a political claim, linking the vulnerability 
of the researcher to a broader politics of vulnerability 
(see Butler et al. 2016). The contestable privilege of 
embodied authorship in relation to audiovisual mate-
rial accrues secondarily to those who, like the director, 
are outside the core space of practice but may also 
be traced visually or auditorily by the camera; thirdly 
to those who, like the videographer, have contributed 
to the practice and its recording without their own 
body being audiovisually traced; and only much later 
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to those who might wish to make use of this material 
without having participated in its generation.4
An ethics of vulnerability reverses common 
assumptions about how audiovisual material is 
produced and edited, including those that underpin 
most intellectual property law. It suggests that the 
videographer who physically makes the image should 
have the least control over it, precisely because of 
the structural power and disembodiment inherent 
in that role. Meanwhile, the practitioner — who is 
structurally vulnerable not only because their body 
is traced but also because they are least able, from 
within the space of practice, to cognize exactly what 
is being recorded as the recording is made — retains 
the greatest share of editorial privilege and control. 
By asserting this logic, dctv pushes back against the 
historical disempowerment of the practitioner role 
which, if we follow Schneider and other theorists of 
4 As suggested above, an ethics of vulnerability cannot be 
separated from a queer feminist analysis of gender. Scheman 
(2012) develops the idea of vulnerability as standpoint 
epistemology and the particular knowledge that comes from 
vulnerable positionality. See also Talia Mae Bettcher on the 
“first-person authority” of trans experience (2009), as well 
as the reclaiming of the gendered, queered, and racialized 
position of “bottom” in Stockton (2006) and Nguyen (2014).
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both directorial and videographic power, incarnates 
and enacts the disempowerment of feminized, racial-
ized, and queer bodies, as well as Agamben’s zoe. 
Of course, taking on the role of practitioner, director, 
videographer, or even editor within a dctv process 
cannot circumvent a lifetime of experience or a whole 
world of statically structured systems of injustice that 
forcibly objectify certain bodies. I am not suggesting 
that the circulation of roles within a dctv lab erases or 
escapes the sedimented identities of the researchers; it 
would be a mistake to attribute such a utopian power 
of remaking the world to any method. On the other 
hand, neither should we underestimate the onto-epis-
temological power of laboratorial cuts by assuming 
that whatever happens within the lab space merely 
repeats or reiterates existing structures and identities. 
If technologies of notation and audiovisual recording 
carry any discursive, argumentative, or rhetorical 
power, that is because they are capable of instituting 
and tracing spaces of experimentation in which the 
circulation of powers can intersect in unexpected and 
even unprecedented ways, including those that can 
only be articulated in multimedial forms.
I do not claim to know what can be done with 
dctv’s audiovisual materials, either ethically, in terms 
of what ought to be done, or aesthetically-politically-
epistemologically, in terms of what kinds of effects 
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this material could potentially have when published 
in academic, artistic, or public spheres. All I want to 
do here is to outline a few principles, or provisional 
starting points, for the development of video works 
generated through this method. First, I want to stress 
again that the raw archive of video generated by a 
dctv lab should be understood as fully co-authored 
by all the participants in a given configuration, as 
each role and relation make an essential contribution 
to the experimental process. (Even a silent and invis-
ible director shapes the practice through their decision 
not to intervene.) That said, the practitioner’s position 
incarnates a unique combination of structural vulner-
ability and epistemic privilege. The practitioner’s 
account of what happened, or what a given session 
was “about,” should therefore take priority whenever 
there is a conflict between editorial visions — although, 
if possible, a better solution is to encourage and 
support the development of multiple editorial perspec-
tives generating diverse videographic works.
At one extreme, dctv video data could be fed into 
a qualitative or even quantitative analytic process by 
tracking words, gestures, eye movements, or other 
discrete elements across bodies, space, and time. 
At the other extreme, it could be made into a kind of 
video art, perhaps analogous to screendance, where 
the audiovisual material stands alone on its aesthetic 
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merits, without explicit methodological framing.5 I am 
personally most interested in a third possibility, which 
I will call hermeneutic research. This refers to the kind 
of research undertaken in the humanities under the 
banner of critical theory and poststructuralist phi-
losophy. Could dctv generate critical interventions, in 
the sense of persuasive and affective arguments that 
unfold through a precise juxtaposition of textuality 
and audiovisuality? Pertinent questions for a herme-
neutic approach to dctv data would include: What 
happened? What did it mean? How can that mean-
ing be articulated and shared? These are interpretive 
questions. They do not assume that the meaning of 
the video is hidden within it through a positivist link to 
the truth of the documented practice, but neither do 
they treat the video as freestanding “found footage” 
unrelated to that practice. Instead, they work the 
tenuous and multiplicitous links between practice 
and document, tracing back and forth between 
them, interpreting this relationship and building that 
interpretation into a series of editorial choices that are 
simultaneously aesthetic and hermeneutic.
Edited videos produced using dctv materials 
should also be understood as co-authored. However, 
5 On screendance, see The International Journal of Screendance 
(http://screendancejournal.org/).
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there are different types and degrees of co-authorship 
at the editorial level. We might recognize, for example, 
a spectrum of co-authorship that runs from collabora-
tion to consent, where the former refers to a substan-
tive process of co-creation within the editorial process 
itself (as described above through the example of the 
Songwork Catalogue) and the latter to the granting 
of permission for editorial choices.6 This spectrum 
suggests the need for a precise credit taxonomy when 
it comes to the attribution of edited video works. In 
the case of fully collaborative co-authorship, the 
names of all authors would presumably be listed 
alphabetically. On the other hand, co-authors who 
are involved via lab participation and subsequent 
consent, but without substantive input to the editorial 
process, might be listed after “with,” as has been done 
in the case of the two Judaica project peer-reviewed 
video articles cited here. In these examples, I am 
6 With present technologies, collaborative video editing still 
necessarily takes place via a back-and-forth process mediated 
by a technological object, rather than through real-time 
interaction. Collaborative writing is usually done this way 
too, although online tools like shared Google Docs now make 
real-time collaborative writing possible. Before too long, such 




listed first to indicate my primary editorship of the 
material, which nevertheless included multiple rounds 
of comments and feedback from the other named 
authors. The need for such distinctions shows how 
the complex co-authorship of audiovisual outputs 
in a dctv process can raise important legal, ethical, 
and political questions appropriate to an audiovisual 
age. With these complexities in mind, we can turn to 
a broader consideration of the onto-epistemological 
interventions made by dctv.
dctv follows Grotowski’s fundamental commit-
ment to an ethical “poverty” that consists in prioritiz-
ing embodiment through embodied practice, embod-
ied knowledge, and embodied research. Grotowski’s 
earliest manifesto, “Towards a Poor Theater,” begins 
from questions about the relationship of embodied 
practice to the audiovisual: “What is the theater? 
What is unique about it? What can it do that film and 
television cannot?” (Grotowski 1982: 18-19). At that 
time, the economic realities of audiovisual recording 
prohibited a post-Grotowskian “poor” grappling with 
audiovisuality. The means of production were simply 
too expensive.7 Today, in contrast, we live in the era of 
the “poor image”:
7 In the same year that the article “Towards a Poor Theatre” 
was first published in Polish (1965), video artist Nam June 
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The poor image is a rag or a rip; an avi or a Jpeg, a 
lumpen proletarian in the class society of appearances, 
ranked and valued according to its resolution. The poor 
image has been uploaded, downloaded, shared, refor-
matted, and reedited. It transforms quality into acces-
sibility, exhibition value into cult value, films into clips, 
contemplation into distraction. The image is liberated 
from the vaults of cinemas and archives and thrust into 
digital uncertainty, at the expense of its own substance. 
The poor image tends towards abstraction: it is a visual 
idea in its very becoming. (Steyerl 2012: 32)
The newly accessible production and circulation 
of “poor” images make it possible to short-circuit 
experimental practice and audiovisuality. In the era of 
the poor image, we can bring audiovisual recording 
into the space of the poor theater and in this way offer 
a third alternative to the two potentialities between 
Paik purchased one of the first Sony portable video cameras 
available in New York. “Suddenly, after many years of 
development within the broadcast industry, the technology 
of television production became available to non-broadcast 
users — the means of televisual production could finally be 
appropriated” (Marshall 1979). This was a key moment in the 
development of video art, which nevertheless has not yet had 
much crossover with post-Grotowskian practice.
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which Grotowski’s work gradually moved, namely 
a performing arts practice oriented towards public 
presentations and an embodied research practice 
with personal or esoteric aims. Poor video enters the 
space of embodied encounter as a fourth relation and 
instantiates a different kind of link with the “outside” 
of laboratorial space, the surrounding world from 
which the laboratory is set apart.
Bringing audiovisual recording into the space of 
poor theater is topologically, and hence ontologically, 
distinct from bringing skilled embodiment into the rich 
laboratories of technoscience. In cognitive studies and 
neuroscience, an increasing interest in skilled and ex-
pert practice has led to the development of many new 
kinds of laboratory setups in which the activities and 
bodily states of practitioners are measured and re-
corded (e.g., Leman 2016; Kerr and Schmalzl 2016). 
Yet the economic and epistemological parameters of 
such studies inevitably place embodied practice at 
the service of technoscientific methods and measure-
ments. As a result, and despite what some proponents 
might claim, neuroscientific studies of skilled practice 
tell us more about brain scanning machines, and the 
disciplines they afford, than about skill, practice, or 
embodiment. Even laboratory designs that aim to 
place “training and the development of artistic skills” 
on even footing with “empirical experimentation” 
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through an interdisciplinary framework (Hansen and 
Barton 2009: 132) have to grapple with the much 
greater institutional, economic, epistemological, 
and political power of the sciences in comparison 
to embodied arts. dctv, in contrast, does not aim 
to be interdisciplinary in this sense. It does not bring 
embodied practice into technoscientific laboratories 
or even bring technoscientific methods, or scientists 
themselves, into the space of embodied practice. 
Rather, building on the economies of the poor image, 
dctv appropriates the relatively old technology 
of the video camera and brings it into a space of 
dynamic configurations structuring embodied roles 
and relations, with the aim of overturning established 
hierarchies of knowledge and reinventing audiovisual-
ity from the perspective of embodiment.
To return to a point made in the first section of 
this text, the opening and closing cuts that define 
dctv’s laboratoriality are not separated in time. 
Dynamic configurations (when they incorporate the 
videographic relation) generate transversal video not 
eventually but immediately, in each moment that the 
camera records. The epistemic gap between the two 
cuts is not a temporal delay. Rather, it is a mutual 
agreement by the research team to operate according 
to a specific configuration of relations, which opens 
up a space of unknown in which no one can predict 
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exactly what will happen. Even or especially if the 
team has been working together for years; even or 
especially if they know each other very well and have 
many shared habits; even or especially if they have 
explicitly agreed to work on certain materials — the 
disaggregated powers specified by dynamic con-
figurations ensure that the interactions between the 
researchers will always be unpredictable. Of course, 
the unpredictability of one given configuration may 
be more or less interesting than another, but as in 
any lab process, this is a matter of intuition as much 
as positive prediction. By the same token, the closing 
laboratorial cut never comprehensively traces what 
happens in any moment. Rather, one tries to imple-
ment it in such a way as to have a reasonably good 
chance of tracing whatever is most likely to prove valu-
able, which is, again, a matter of guesswork as much 
as established knowledge. Reading the experimental 
process backwards, as Barad does, we must then 
acknowledge that transversal video does much more 
than document an event that would have taken 
place regardless. In other words, the presence of the 
camera absolutely does change what happens — not 
in the sense of a reduction, as might be expected, but 
through a radical transformation and expansion of 
the onto-epistemological status of the experimental 
moment. By generating audiovisual traces that will 
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later be available for reworking and dissemination, 
the presence of the camera ensures that what hap-
pens ceases to be training or rehearsal and becomes 
instead a kind of ongoing and iterative audiovisual 
research grounded in embodied practice.
The two cuts of dctv can be used to structure any 
practice session, even on a one-time basis or over the 
course of a few days. However, dctv’s true value as a 
research method is only revealed when it is used over a 
period of weeks or months, with enough time to allow 
for the development of an iterative cycle of alternation 
between its two distinct temporalities: the temporality 
of the lab and the temporality of lab design and the 
editor function. The second of these is continuous with 
the temporality of life outside the lab, with everyday 
life, or what is often called the “real world,” within 
which the lab is located. This temporality obtains both 
before and after the laboratorial moment or cut (a cut 
that is understood to be two cuts). Before the cut, lab-
oratory sessions are designed, perhaps with reference 
to written proposals using dc notation. Additional 
details, such as the choice of materials to be practiced 
and the time, location, and duration of the session, 
may also be agreed upon. After the cut, the audio-
visual outputs of the lab are viewed and discussed, 
in whole or in part; their meaning is analyzed and 
debated; selections, titles, and other editorial choices 
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are made; and audiovisual catalogues, essays, and 
other works may be published. In an iterative process, 
these “before” and “after” tasks merge, as discus-
sions prompted by the audiovisual materials feed 
into decisions about the next round of lab design. 
Of course, the role of lab designer, like that of editor, 
should not be held entirely by an individual. There 
may be a project leader, who proposes lab designs 
in accordance with project goals, with the rest of the 
team contributing on a collaborative or consensual 
basis. Alternatively, the role of lab designer could 
circulate between individuals, or it could emerge 
from a fully collaborative process. Over time, it is the 
back-and-forth, iterative process of moving between 
these two temporalities that gives dctv the potential 
to short-circuit the poor theater and the poor image, 
perhaps revealing a new approach to the relationship 
between embodiment and audiovisuality.
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Towards a Queer Laboratory
Bruno Latour writes, “a laboratory has to put itself 
at risk” (2004: 216). The appearance of dctv as 
a research method completely overturned many 
assumptions around which I had been working for 
years. In the context of daily experimental practice, 
what at first had been a simple strategy of rotat-
ing roles quickly evolved into a flexible system for 
designing practice sessions and then revealed itself 
as a radically new research method. As the lab work 
became messier and more apparently chaotic, the 
epistemological significance of the opening and 
closing cuts emerged, leading to further clarification 
of the method and, in turn, a greater abundance of 
possibilities. Eventually it became possible, some-
times, even to blur the boundaries between the roles 
as specified by dc notation. This happened by prior 
agreement when, for example, we modified the nota-
tion so as to indicate a director who can move in and 
out of the space of practice at will. It also happened 
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spontaneously, in moments of transgression — such as 
when, without prior arrangement, a director sud-
denly gave an order to a videographer; a practitioner 
suddenly took hold of the camera and turned it on 
herself; or a videographer spent a long time recording 
the details of a new physical site without ever pointing 
the camera towards the practitioner. Such transgres-
sions were often passionately discussed afterwards, in 
relation to how they did or did not break the agree-
ments underpinning the method and what kinds of 
audiovisual material they generated. When these 
moments seemed to be going too far, so that the lab 
sessions began to feel messy in an unproductive rather 
than a generative way, I suggested that we return to 
the basic configurations and adhere more strictly to 
the notation as a prescriptive score. Through many 
iterative cycles, between the temporality of discussion 
and editing and the temporality of the lab, more and 
more possibilities opened up.
At the beginning of this process, I held a com-
pletely different idea about how to establish rigor in 
embodied research. Influenced by Grotowski and his 
legacies, I had the research team begin in an empty 
studio, hoping to develop new technique of “song-
action” through an almost purely embodied practice. 
I realized that dctv was a powerful new method only 
when it blew away many of my assumptions about 
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embodied research. This began to occur with our 
abandonment of the spatial metaphor, as the re-
search team gradually discovered that the three basic 
dc roles need not occupy separate physical spaces in 
order to retain their epistemic differences. A further 
set of discoveries occurred when anthropologist and 
performer Caroline Gatt visited the lab, bringing her 
research on the “liveliness of books” (Gatt 2017) into 
contact with our studio practice. Gatt invited us to 
bring books into the laboratory and — influenced by 
anthropological and indigenous research engage-
ments with place (e.g., Tuck and McKenzie 2014) — to 
pay more attention to our physical milieu. Her visit 
prompted us to invite a series of guests into the lab 
over the following weeks, including performers, visual 
artists, and musicians, some of whom were also 
friends or family of the team members. Eventually we 
realized that the studio enclosure itself was not strictly 
necessary and that the method could function just 
as well in a variety of sites. It was during this period 
that I began to suspect that we were dealing not with 
embodied research in general but with a very specific 
new kind of audiovisual embodied research.
Timothy Lenoir identifies this kind of rapid epis-




[O]nce the system has become familiar to those who 
inhabit it, its own momentum may take over. The more 
the experimenter learns to manipulate the system, the 
better the system comes to realize its intrinsic capaci-
ties: in Rheinberger’s terms the experimental system 
starts to manipulate the researcher and to lead him or 
her in unforeseen directions. (Foreword to Rheinberger 
2010: xvi)
Where at first a narrow focus on embodied technique 
had seemed necessary in establishing the rigor of the 
research, the dctv laboratory increasingly became 
a wildly open place in which it sometimes felt that 
anything could happen and be accommodated. 
This process was revelatory because the two cuts of 
dctv, which were only identified weeks after they had 
first been implemented, made visible a multitude of 
explicit and implicit cuts that were no longer neces-
sary, such as the architectural cut separating the lab 
space from the rest of the world; the “embodiment” 
cut separating song and movement from books and 
clothing; the professional academic cut separating 
friendship and kinship from research; and the basic 
subject–object division that still underpins many 
theorizations of research. All of these, we found, could 
be discarded. The laboratory, no longer a physical 
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site but instead a designated time and place defined 
by methodological laboratoriality, could now become 
a true heterotopia (Foucault 1986b): a place in which 
not only bodies and songs but also individuals, ob-
jects, books, histories, places, guests, family relations, 
prior collaborations, and much more could come 
together in genuinely unpredictable and experimental 
ways. The collapse of these boundaries increasingly 
conspired to make each lab session a joyful mess, 
but only and precisely because, despite this apparent 
messiness, the underpinning laboratorial structure did 
not collapse. The epistemic gap designated by the 
combination of dynamic configurations and trans-
versal video was rigorous enough to hold all of this 
queer mess together through increasingly complex 
lab sessions (Figure 8), including site-specific labs 
(Figure 9) and performance labs (Figure 10), as well 
as workshops (Figure 11).1
1 In addition to four months of studio lab sessions in 
Huddersfield, uk, the ahrc-funded Judaica project organized 
a series of more than twenty events in 2017, including site-
based labs, open (public) labs, theatrical performances, and 
workshops in the United States, United Kingdom, and Poland. 
Hosting organizations included The Grotowski Institute and 
White Stork Synagogue (Wrocław); polin Museum (Warsaw); 
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Figure 8. Complex lab session, August 3, 2017. From left: Nazlıhan 
Eda Erçin, Elaine Spatz-Rabinowitz, Ben Spatz, and Agnieszka 
Mendel. Photo by Garry Cook. For a video essay created with 
materials from this session, see “Diaspora” (Spatz with Erçin, 
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Figure 9. Site-specifi c lab session, September 8, 
2017. Ruined synagogue, Działoszyce, Poland. From 
left: Ben Spatz, Agnieszka Mendel, and Nazlıhan 




Figure 10. Performance lab session, 
September 23, 2017. polin: Museum 
of The History of Polish Jews, Warsaw, 
Poland. From left: Agnieszka Mendel, 
Nazlıhan Eda Erçin, and Ben Spatz. 
Photo by Ewa Chomicka.
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Figure 11. Workshop, September 22, 
2017. Ilona Krawczyk as practitioner, 
seen through the videographic lens 
of a mobile phone. The Grotowski 
Institute, Wrocław, Poland. Photo by 
Piotr Spigiel.
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I invoke “queer” here to indicate the onto-episte-
mological significance of the circulation of roles and 
powers in the dctv lab, as well as the sense of mess 
and chaos that this method can rigorously support, 
contain, and make publishable. Ethnographic studies 
of queer lives have long raised “questions about 
the place of conventional research techniques in 
examinations of messy and unstable subjectivities 
and social lives” and asked what might constitute a 
queer method or methodology (Browne and Nash 
2012: 3). Obviously, a method, on one level, is just a 
tool. A method is not a politics or a substitute for a 
politics. Like a theater laboratory, a technoscience 
laboratory, or a kinky play space, there is nothing that 
can absolutely prevent a dctv lab from being run in 
Museum (Kraków); nyu Department of Performance Studies, 
nyu Steinhardt School, the Martin E. Segal Theater Center 
at cuny, cuny Center for Jewish Studies, siti Thought Center, 
and Leimay/Cave (New York City); The Institute for Somatics 
and Social Justice, Jewish Voice for Peace, The Whole 
Shebang, and FringeArts (Philadelphia); Wesleyan University 
(Middletown); Tufts Hillel and Studio@550 (Boston area); 
Jw3 Jewish Cultural Centre, Royal Central School of Speech 
and Drama, and Goldsmiths (London); University of Kent; 
University of Manchester; and University of Leeds. A calendar 
and further details about these events are available on the 
Urban Research Theater website.
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an autocratic or even abusive way. What dctv does 
is make certain power dynamics more perceptible 
and evident, by formalizing them as the fundamental 
structuring principle of its embodied research. With 
dctv, one can never move invisibly from the role of 
director or videographer to that of editor, taking along 
with them another person’s audiovisual body. Instead, 
one remains bound to a complex negotiation of 
co-authorship amongst all research partners, in which 
the configuration of power relations is more explicit. 
For those wishing to develop an ethical practice 
linked to a wider politics, dctv offers an alternative 
set of tools for working with and transforming both 
embodied practice and audiovisual embodiment. 
More specifically, the method crystallizes a structural 
and methodological queerness through the circula-
tion of roles and powers that are conventionally and 
historically gendered as well as raced.
In classic feminist film theory (Mulvey 1989), there 
are two gendered positions: the feminine object of 
the gaze and the masculine subject who is at once 
director, videographer, editor, and eventual spectator. 
In dctv, videography and editing are not subsumed 
within a (masculine) directorial vision and powers 
are not stacked but instead disaggregated. This 
produces a multiplicity of gendered positions within 
and outside the temporality of practice, each of 
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which can circulate across the bodies and identities 
of the researchers. At a simple level, following what 
we might call a sociological or activist understand-
ing of identities as relatively stable, this means that 
the genders embodied by the researchers are able 
to mix and match with the gendering of the various 
roles and relations they take on during the process. 
Going further, we might even find that the genders of 
the researchers are at least temporarily destabilized 
by this process, since gender itself is constituted by, 
and not merely generative of, precisely these kinds of 
techniques and relations. The techniques of external-
ity, observation, direction, gaze, and desire that make 
up the roles and relations defined by dc notation are 
not simply gendered in the sense of being marked by 
or linked to gender, but are themselves components in 
the construction of gender.2 By making these elements 
explicit, dctv works with gender methodologically, 
even when gender is not an explicit focus of the 
2 For a more detailed consideration of how gender is materially 
discovered, invented, and transformed through innovations in 
embodied technique, see Spatz (2015), Chapter 4: “Gender 
as Technique.” I am not suggesting that a few days of dctv 
practice can substantively alter someone’s gender identity. 
On the other hand, neither can embodied research be seen as 
merely expressive of a prior identity.
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research. In fact, dctv queers the gendering of inter-
personal relations in concrete and formalized ways, 
inviting the “creative production of new, alternative 
gender formations” (Hale 1997: 234).
My use of queer here obviously does not refer 
to binary homosexuality, but is closer to what Eliza 
Steinbock calls “trans-inter-queer,” precisely in the 
context of cinematic production: a kaleidoscopic and 
“shimmering” range of negotiations with “divided 
embodiment, illegible sexualities, and indistinct 
morphologies” (Steinbock 2019: 19–21). In this case, 
the divisions, illegibilities, and indistinctions I am refer-
ring to cannot necessarily be independently located 
within the bodies of the researchers. Rather, they arise 
from the fragmentation and recombination of roles, 
powers, and relations, through an iterative process 
that destabilizes the meanings of audiovisual bodies, 
opening them up as epistemic objects.3 Steinbock’s 
3 Notably, Steinbock also uses typographic symbols to 
formalize and abstract modes of relation that she identifies 
as both trans-inter-queer and cinematic: “The forward slash 
[/] echoes with queer deconstruction moves; the hyphen 
[-], with hybrid culture and sexed identities; and the more 
recent asterisk [*], with digital inclusion through profusion” 
(2019: 21). However, in the context of Steinbock’s critical 
spectatorial film analysis, these formalized elements refer, on 
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reference to a “surgeon/film operator” who “brings 
a transformed subject to life through cuts and 
sutures on a material strip” (153) suggests the kind of 
entanglement between embodiment and audiovisual-
ity that dctv attempts to implement. While Steinbock 
and others wonder to what extent cinema itself might 
be “paradigmatically trans* in its somatechnical 
capacities” (Keegan, Horak, and Steinbock 2018: 2), 
I am interested in how trans-inter-queer knowledge 
and practice can be rendered technical in order to 
enact transformations that extend beyond, without 
displacing, activist movements that rely upon stable 
notions of identity. If cinema as a medium “is ripe for a 
somatechnical approach,” this cannot only refer to a 
mode of critical analysis that recognizes the entangle-
ment of embodiment and audiovisuality. It must also 
suggest the development of concrete pathways into 
future experimentation.
With this in mind, and by way of conclusion, I want 
to consider some of the concrete, methodological 
techniques or principles through which dctv supports 
the implementation of a queer laboratory. First, at 
the cinematic side, primarily to the completed film or video 
work and its audiovisual montage, rather than, as in dctv, 
to the interactive relations of production that structure the 
generation of raw video material.
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the heart of the method, is auto-experimentation or 
what Paul Preciado calls the “principle of the auto-
guinea pig,” according to which “anyone wishing to 
be a political subject will begin by being the lab rat in 
her or his own laboratory” (2013: 348, 353). Indeed, 
the subject–object cut implemented by most social 
science methods remains one of the most difficult 
problems for queer and feminist researchers, continu-
ing to generate a tension between the desire to foster 
genuine collaboration and solidarity with communi-
ties and the need to maintain the epistemic distance 
of the researcher. How can one get a handle on 
anything that resembles knowledge, without placing a 
sharp cut between the researcher and the researched? 
For Preciado, “All philosophy is intended to be a form 
of autovivisection — when it isn’t a form of dissection 
of the other. It is an exercise in self-cutting, an incision 
into subjectivity” (2013: 259).4 As we have seen, the 
4 Preciado highlights post-pornography, among other cultural-
aesthetic movements, as an “epistemological inversion, 
a radical displacement of the subject of pornographic 
enunciation,” in which “those who had been passive objects 
of the pornographic and the disciplinary gaze (‘women,’ ‘porn 
actors and actresses,’ ‘whores,’ ‘fags and dykes,’ ‘perverts,’ 
‘crips,’ etc.) become subjects of representation, thereby 
putting in question the (aesthetic and somato-political) 
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turn to auto-experimentation often pushes artists 
into solo practice, where the problem of hierarchy is 
resolved by bringing powers together in a single body. 
dctv supports a kind of auto-experimentation that 
is fractionally distributed across multiple bodies, al-
lowing each member of the team to circulate through 
several versions of experimenter and experimentee. 
This process leaves traces in the form of experimental 
audiovisual bodies, which each researcher can then 
encounter and reframe in the editing process.
The principle of auto-experimentation in dctv is 
supported by the technique of dynamic configura-
tions, which from a queer or kinky perspective we 
might also call “switch as method.” In bdsm and 
kink culture, the “verb ‘switch’ has become a noun 
which names those who frequently change roles: the 
codes that make their bodies and sexual practices visible and 
produc[e] the impression of the natural stability of sexual 
relations and gender relationships” (2013: 273). Possible 
post-pornographic or counter-pornographic applications 
of dctv are beyond the scope of this book. However, there is 
no reason why a dctv lab could not work with sexual as well 
as nonsexual dimensions of embodiment, ideally in a queer 
and transfeminist context. Something along these lines this 
has even been called “ethnopornography” (McNamara et al. 
2015: 47). See Marks (2002: 38).
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switches” (Call 2012: 8). Moreover, as Lewis Call 
suggests: “The unique structure of switchy desire 
makes the switch an important political figure.” There 
has been surprisingly little theorization of switch even 
in studies of bdsm. Like bisexuality and nonbinary 
gender, it tends to be overlooked in favor of more 
apparently coherent identities, in this case top and 
bottom, or dominant and submissive. When switch 
is discussed, it is still usually understood as a role or 
identity, rather than as an epistemic standpoint or 
method. But Katherine Martinez, noting the statistical 
tendency of kinky roles to follow conventional gender 
identities — with men more often playing as tops and 
women more often playing as bottoms — has noted 
the potential of role fluidity in bdsm to deconstruct 
and destabilize hegemonic binaries of gender and 
sexuality (2018: 1304; see Califia-Rice 1994). In 
dctv, switch is more than a behavior or preference; it 
is a methodological principle. By constantly inviting, 
through the formalization of its opening cut, the 
redistribution of powers and relations across bodies, 
the method calls into question the assumption that 
an individual can or should permanently identify as 
a director, performer, or videographer, and therefore 
also the genders those techniques help to construct.
While auto-experimentation and switch as method 
appear immediately in the dctv lab through the 
168
making a laboratory
structuring invitations of dynamic configurations, 
a deeper and richer kind of queerness arrives only 
over time, through a queer iteration between the two 
temporalities of the method: the temporality of the lab 
and that of editing and lab design. This is because 
dctv disaggregates powers not only synchronically, 
in dynamic configurations, but also diachronically, 
through the iterative relationship between these two 
temporalities. In this context, Elizabeth Freeman’s 
discussion of both film and bdsm as sites for queer 
grapplings with history and knowledge is relevant. 
Following the “corporeal turn” in film studies (Keegan, 
Horak, and Steinbock 2018: 5), Freeman sees film and 
video as privileged media for wrestling with power and 
identity because of the tactile and flexibly indexical 
way in which the editor works with the audiovisual 
material: “[T]o pause on a given image, to repeat an 
image over and over, or to double an existing film in 
a remake or reshoot become productively queer ways 
to ‘desocialize’ that [patriarchal and/or colonial] gaze 
and intervene on the historical condition of seeing 
itself” (Freeman 2010: xviii). Linking filmmaking to 
bdsm is Freeman’s assertion that “history may enter 
through the bottom” (163) — in other words, that 
knowledge may be generated through sensual and 
sensory play; that pleasure as well as pain is a valid 
mode of engagement with the past; and that such a 
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“bottom historiography” (120) importantly queers 
the assumptions of positivist historiographies that 
attempt to pin down the past in masculinist terms 
(162).5 In Freeman’s historiographic discussion, the 
past refers to the historical past as it is reconstructed 
and reinvented in both film and bdsm. This is what she 
means by “the temporal aspect of sadomasochism” 
(169). dctv certainly traces, investigates, and plays/
works with this kind of past or history as it appears 
5 Analyzing power relations in a short film by black queer artist 
Isaac Julien, Freeman provides another possible name for 
the > relation, attendance, where the attendant is one who 
is in a position “to wait for, to expect, but also to go, follow, 
accompany, wait on, to be in constant motion on behalf of 
another” (2010: 148). A bit later, quoting Saidiya Hartman, 
Freeman links this to an act of “re-membering” that “takes the 
form of attending to the body as a site of pleasure, eros, and 
sociality, and articulating its violated condition” (162, italics 
in original). Previously, in the same chapter, she identifies the 
sadist in bdsm as “witness to as well as executor of violence,” 
who “secures a different ‘will have been’” for the bottom 
(142). These can all be appreciated as further ramifications 
and resonances of the > relation as it attends to the affects 
emerging from the practitioner, which as Freeman highlights 
are never only a matter of individual pain or pleasure but 
always also linked to cultural histories of trauma and survival, 
shame and pleasure and celebration.
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both through the bodies of the researchers and in the 
emplacement of the lab work in a particular site.6 But 
dctv brings a further development of this queerness 
insofar as the relationship between its two temporali-
ties is ongoing and iterative.
The dctv editor — whether that function is fulfilled 
by one person or several — is materially, audiovisually, 
embodied in the materials they are editing. They are 
playing/working with their own audiovisual body. If 
poststructuralism and queer theory have revealed the 
essentially and not merely contingent fragmentation 
of the subject, dctv implements that revelation as 
6 I have introduced dctv through a series of roles and relations, 
all of which define human positions in the onto-epistemic 
space of the lab. This could be taken to imply that dctv 
is a humanist method in which the primacy of the human 
is sustained. However, in the audiovisual closing cut, site 
and emplacement are as fully present as embodiment, 
sometimes even more so. Video as a medium affords no 
strict cut or division between body and place. There is 
then no reason why dynamic configurations should not be 
understood as an experimental relation to place as much 
as to the embodied materials designated by the underscore 
_. This post-humanist aspect of dctv remains to be further 
explored. On relationships between place, indigeneity, and 
“audiovisualizing,” see for example Jessica Bissett Perea 
(2017).
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method by placing the researcher in a position to 
work videographically with audiovisual fragments 
of their own past. Further, in dctv, this iterative 
process does not emerge from a solo endeavor (as 
in much of the performance and video art studied 
by Schneider), but from a process of structured and 
collaborative co-authorship. This means that the 
fragments of one’s own audiovisual body that one 
works with as editor are always already shot through 
and entangled with the audiovisual bodies of others, 
as well as of the place of those encounters. There is 
an auto-ethnographic aspect to this process, yet the 
video material one encounters as editor is in no way 
equivalent to one’s own phenomenological recollec-
tion of experiences had during the recorded sessions. 
Whatever one did in that moment — let’s say, as prac-
titioner — was done in relation and response to others. 
My body, as I encounter it through the editor function, 
is made up of elements and traces of my being as they 
were summoned and selected in that moment by my 
companions. Our practicing, directing, and vide-
ographic bodies mingle in the resulting video material 
in a way that is both documentary and aesthetic, both 
critical and erotic. At the same time, history proper 
is present in the gendered, racial, educational, and 
other backgrounds and inheritances that make up our 
more sedimented layers of embodiment and place. 
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Even in the initial moment of editing, after just a few 
lab sessions, it is already impossible to disentangle 
these sedimented histories from those that emerge 
through our embodied interactions. As the process it-
erates between lab sessions and editing, the degree of 
entanglement increases. Each lab session generates 
new material to be watched, discussed, and edited. 
Outside the laboratory, we look backwards, through 
the video footage, as well as forwards, through the 
notated configurations that will structure future 
sessions and the audiovisual outputs that will testify to 
the world about what happened there.
The two temporalities never meet. (Perhaps they 
could, in theory, but new cuts might then be needed 
to prevent the laboratoriality of the process from 
collapsing.) Yet they continually inform and transform 
each other. As a result, instead of a single moment of 
bottom historiography, in which sedimented histories 
are unearthed and queerly reworked, the transit 
between temporalities happens over and over again, 
back and forth. History in both major and minor 
senses — the history of the world, which is carried 
in the bodies and places that meet in the labs, and 
the history of the iterative research process itself — is 
continually being opened and played/worked with. 
But it is also continually being edited, composed, and 
brought into a montage. There is not one moment of 
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“fabulation,” a single “temporal duration interposed 
between negative and print, between a film’s shoot 
and its projection before an audience” (Nyong’o 2019: 
51), but a fabulative process that happens again and 
again: shoot, projection, shoot, projection, shoot, 
projection… The iterative intermingling of these two 
temporalities queers both by linking them in a process 
of indefinite entanglement. Of course, this kind of 
queer iteration can be found in various forms across 
many different film projects, communities, and time 
periods, as in the works of queer film theory cited 
here. What makes dctv a queer method, however, 
is its determination to sustain the entanglement of 
individuals and traces across time and space.
This entanglement is the final queer aspect of 
dctv that I want to consider, addressing two of its 
most important implications: the entanglement 
of authorship and the end of the audience. The 
entanglement of authorship begins in the lab and 
continues through the editor function, as described 
above. Although the experimental setup admits no 
over-arching author, the editor does have the power, 
with consent, to impose a kind of coherent vision 
that may be required to generate a legible work of 
art or scholarship. Yet dctv generates an especially 
intensive and challenging entanglement through its 
production of open-ended audiovisual material from 
174
making a laboratory
experimental practice. In conventional performance 
documentation, the meaning of the video is referred 
back to the intentions of the live or theatrical project. 
This means that the power structures organizing the 
live project carry over to the video. Even when there 
is video of rehearsals as well as performances, it 
can usually be assumed that the participants agree 
at least on what is being rehearsed. Indeed, when 
participants are interviewed to provide commentary 
on the documentary footage, they most often talk not 
about the specifics of a recorded moment, but about 
the overall process or project and its aims. Individual 
audiovisual moments are then used in an illustrative 
way, as part of a coherent narrative. In contrast, the 
audiovisual recordings from a dctv lab are radically 
open-ended. They are videographic shards, avail-
able to radically divergent interpretations. With the 
assumed links between director, videographer, and 
editor broken, participants are not just audiovisually 
but also epistemically and ethically entangled through 
these recordings. On the one hand, every moment is 
potentially available as raw data to be interpreted 
and composed according to a particular editorial 
vision. On the other hand, the requirement of consent 
and the invitation to collaborate mean that no one is 
empowered simply to do whatever they like with this 
material. Subsequent reworkings and new montages 
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will bring different interpretations of what happened, 
which will need to be discussed and agreed upon 
by all the authors of a given moment, before being 
shared more widely.
Furthermore, this entanglement fills the space of 
any dctv lab, encompassing everything and everyone 
present and demolishing any possibility of a “fourth 
wall” that could allow a conventional audience to 
witness such a lab in action. This is unavoidable in 
a social and technological context where, no mat-
ter how large the live audience, the digital one is 
potentially thousands or millions of times larger. As 
all genres of live performance increasingly recognize, 
“the” audience can no longer be present in a general 
way, as a “general” audience representing a “general” 
public. Instead, everyone who is physically present 
becomes recognizable as a contributor, if not a full 
co-author, of the unfolding event. The era in which it 
could be imagined that a live event attains the status 
of artistic work by being performed “in public” is over. 
This means that the era of “the” audience is also over, 
because the presence of even a single video camera 
potentially incorporates the audiovisual bodies of 
everyone who is present. The role of the spectator is 
easy enough to define in dc notation. They are like 
a director who cannot intervene, or a videographer 
without a camera: someone who has an external 
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witnessing relation to the practitioner, without any 
inscriptive power of their own. But incorporating such 
a role ethically requires a complete rethinking of the 
nature and extent of their entanglement in what takes 
place. Is it permissible to record such spectators? If 
so, do they then to some extent become practition-
ers, since their audiovisual bodies are traced? If they 
do, should they then be given access to the resulting 
video recordings? Are they permitted to edit and 
publish their own versions of those recordings and 
to make their own interpretations and claims about 
what happened? Are they permitted to make their 
own recordings of the event, becoming independent 
videographers?
Video cameras entangle bodies in ways we 
are only beginning to understand and which pose 
significant aesthetic and epistemic problems for live 
performance. This has been true for decades but is 
increasingly apparent today, in an age of omnipres-
ent surveillance and casual violations of privacy, 
when a printed sign on a door may be taken as 
implicit consent to be recorded. dctv offers no final 
or complete answers when it comes to adapting the 
existing structures of live spectatorship for a digital 
age. It simply offers an alternative perspective from 
which to approach such questions, beginning from 
the premise that everyone who is present has a role 
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to fill, a power to wield, and a share in the author-
ship of resulting documents. Topologically, from a 
dctv perspective, it is not at all that the audience is 
excluded from the lab, as opposed to being invited to 
the theater. Rather, everyone is invited into the lab, 
with the understanding that the presence of the video 
camera fundamentally changes our relations to each 
other and to place, resulting in ethical and epistemic 
entanglements that extend indefinitely across time 
and space, linking us by invisible threads as long as 
those video materials exist somewhere to be taken up, 
interpreted, edited, composed, and re-shared. Those 
techniques of observation by which the idea of the 
general audience was invented — such as having a 
large number of participants at an event sit to-
gether silently in darkness — are obsolete in a world of 
omnipresent audiovisual recording. In this sense, the 
end of the audience does not mean their banishment 
but the queering of those gendered and racialized 
distances that formerly made the differences between 
practitioners, directors, videographers, editors, and 
spectators so apparently clear.
I have now elaborated a few of the principles 
underpinning my claim that dctv implements a queer 
kind of laboratory: auto-experimentation, switch as 
method, queer iteration, the entanglement of author-
ship, and the end of the audience. Many of these can 
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be applied to other practices and increasingly also to 
new research methods emerging at the edges of inter-
disciplinary research in academia. None of them were 
entirely invented by me or my colleagues. dctv brings 
them together in a particular crystallized form, giving 
methodological rigor to a set of discoveries about 
power and knowledge that have been developed 
over many years in queer, feminist, and decolonial 
practice, critical theory, experimental performance, 
and countless lineages of performing and embodied 
arts. In this short book, I have tried to give due credit 
and to honor some of those sources, while laying out 
the basics of dctv for those who might want to make 
use of it. I hope that for some readers the next step 
will be to implement dctv in your own contexts, which 
of course may also mean changing and adapting it 
according to your needs. This particular introduction 
to dctv as a research method derives from my own 
institutional context in academia, which hopefully 
will not unduly limit the uses to which these ideas 
and techniques can be put. One can thematize or 
even formalize power relations without using the dc 
notation; one can introduce transversal video into 
experimental practice without conceptualizing it as a 
closing laboratorial cut; one can develop an iterative, 
cyclical relation between video generation and video 
editing without treating the video material that links 
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these two temporalities as open-ended research data; 
and so on.
Perhaps the most obvious large-scale imple-
mentation of dctv would be the development of 
laboratory models for academic practice research 
and artistic research in performing arts. Whether at 
undergraduate, postgraduate, doctoral, or advanced 
research levels, this would immediately allow for 
more rigorously collaborative processes of a kind that 
are commonplace in the sciences, but which remain 
uncommon or unavailable in the arts, where the 
argument for “research” still relies heavily on method-
ologies drawn from the humanities. Beyond this and 
in the longer term, I am sure that more far-ranging 
institutional implementations could be found. dctv 
could be part of a multi-modal complex that incor-
porates more conventional performing arts processes 
such as training, rehearsal, and public performance. 
Although none of these are required to implement a 
dctv lab, there is also nothing to prevent laboratorial-
ity in my sense from interfacing with or returning to 
standard performing arts conventions from the new 
angle articulated here. On the other hand, perhaps 
something like dctv could be used to make a new 
kind of movie — one in which not only the narrative 
or editorial composition, but also the substantive 
directorial and videographic powers, would emerge 
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unpredictably from the process, so that no single 
director, documentarian, or ethnographer maintained 
control over the resulting work.
We could go even further and call dctv a method 
for the invention of micropolitics; a strategy to develop 
“countervisuality” (Mirzoeff 2011); a site for cyborg 
decolonization between “cinema and the university” 
(la paperson 2017: 36); or a “situated aporia” 
designed to “invert the gaze” afforded by the audio-
visual (Gómez-Barris 2017: 62, 98). From my own 
experience, I can say that within and around a dctv 
lab it is possible to generate a kind of radical abun-
dance: not the abundance of capitalist expansion and 
research “excellence,” but a joyful, ethically sensitive, 
critical oriented abundance that links us palpably, 
materially, and archivally to “the unmediated, 
priceless realms that have not succumbed to scarcity” 
(Rasmussen 2002: 92). This is, above all, because 
the dctv method does not allow one to maintain 
standard distinctions between technique, identity, 
and place. The queer entanglement described above 
means that the “visible identities” (Alcoff 2005) of 
the participants and of the physical site or location of 
each lab — precisely those relations of embodiment 
and emplacement that have been concealed by the 
supposed universality of positivist thought — can no 
longer be hidden away. Whatever embodied material 
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is being researched, whatever knowledge is brought 
into the lab, the audiovisual tracing of practice always 
reveals its indelible connections to particular bodies, 
identities, and places, slicing through the objectifying 
cuts that continue to structure so much academic 
research. If technique, identity, and place — or knowl-
edge, power, and ecology — are no longer separable, 
then what is research? Perhaps what we are looking at 
here is not just the potential for research methods to 
extend beyond academia, but also their potential to 
transform academia by redrawing its most fundamen-
tal internal and external boundaries.
Further connections might be drawn, for example 
by reclaiming the lost link between “laboratory” 
and “labor” in the Marxist sense and in this way 
“deactivating” (Agamben 2016: 247) and radical-
izing the laboratory as a site for the transformation of 
university and world. In its short-circuiting of embodi-
ment and audiovisuality, the dctv lab seems to invent 
something that is not merely interdisciplinary, but 
which pertains to the technological era in relation to 
the life of the species. This is a “video way of thinking” 
(Spatz 2020), a possibility to reshape social institu-
tions through a fundamentally different relationship 
with embodiment than that which is afforded by the 
technology of writing and the corresponding “writ-
ing way of thinking.” Returning for a moment to the 
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question of what kind of video dctv generates, let me 
affirm again that the videos produced by such experi-
ments and iterations should never be compared to live 
performance in terms of what they do or do not cap-
ture or make available. Such comparisons only shore 
up writing as the hidden term, the unmarked medium 
of thought, since we do not (any longer) worry that 
writing about life will replace or erase it. Instead, the 
short-circuiting of embodiment and audiovisuality 
that dctv achieves should be used to decenter writing 
and to counter logocentrism, putting into practice 
what has been suggested by critical theory at least 
since Walter Benjamin. This is the heart of the dctv 
method’s politics and the basis for its claim to queer, 
feminist, decolonial, or any other kind of ethical-
political intervention. For decades, it has been argued 
that cinema and video constitute their own modes of 
thought. Yet the “thinker” of this thought has always 
been behind the camera, as director/videographer/
editor, separated by the lens from the structurally 
vulnerable, yet epistemically privileged, racialized 
and gendered role of the performer or practitioner. 
dctv is above all a proposal for a kind of videographic 
thinking in which the body that is traced audiovisually 
is understood as enacting primary thought. In dctv, 
this happens not by collapsing all the cinematic roles 
into a single body that unites subject and object, but 
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by further splitting or disaggregating the roles and 
powers that enable videographic production and 
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